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THE FALLACY OF CHOICE:
THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF SCHOOL
VOUCHERS ON CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES
IAN FARRELL* AND CHELSEA MARX**
This Article addresses the impact of school voucher programs on students
with disabilities. We show that for children with disabilities, the price of admission
into so-called “school choice” programs is so high that it is effectively no real
choice at all. School voucher programs require students with disabilities to sign
away their robust federal rights and protections in the public school system.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—the preeminent
legislative safeguard for students with disabilities—these rights include the
right to a “free and appropriate public education” delivered through an
“individualized education plan.” By giving up these protections, children with
disabilities are left at the mercy of private schools that have no legal obligation
to provide them with an appropriate education, and, in the vast majority of
cases, are not legally prohibited from discriminating against them on the basis
of their disability. We argue that school voucher programs—including a proposed
federal voucher program—put the education of students with disabilities back
decades, and likely constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
In a nationally televised interview on March 11, 2017, the U.S.
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos advocated for the benefits of
voucher programs, also called “school choice” programs by Secretary
DeVos and other proponents.1 School voucher programs have long
been Secretary DeVos’s signature policy initiative, predating her
tenure in the Trump administration and stretching back to her
leadership roles in non-profit organizations.2 School voucher programs
allow qualifying students to attend private schools using public funds,
in the form of “vouchers,” to pay for part or all of the private school
tuition. Critics of school vouchers contend that these programs cause
funding flight from public school systems and divert public resources
into the coffers of private—and overwhelmingly religious—organizations.3
Supporters of school vouchers claim that vouchers provide two
benefits. First, they claim that vouchers increase freedom of choice in
education by allowing parents to place children in the schools of their
choosing, rather than in underperforming public schools. Second, school
voucher proponents claim that vouchers increase competition and
efficiency in education.4 School choice advocates also claim that
1. Lesley Stahl, Betsy DeVos on Guns, School Choice and Why People Don’t Like Her,
CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/secretaryof-education-betsy-devos-on-guns-school-choice-and-why-people-dont-like-her.
2. See id.
3. See id.; School Vouchers, ACLU (2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/religiousliberty/religion-and-public-schools/school-vouchers (arguing that school vouchers
lead to taxpayers funding religious instruction).
4. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
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vouchers are especially beneficial for students with disabilities.
Advocates of voucher programs have made this claim so often that
students with disabilities have been described as the “poster children”
of the voucher movement.5 This claim is difficult to reconcile with
the legal and practical effects of voucher programs on these
vulnerable students. To participate in school voucher programs,
students with disabilities are required to give up most, if not all, of
their rights under federal law. Giving up these rights entails giving up
access to resources that allow them to fulfill their educational
potential. These students must also give up the federal right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of their disability.
These forfeitures are far from insubstantial. To alleviate these hardships,
Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).6
The IDEA guarantees every child a “free appropriate public education.”7 It
contains comprehensive substantive and procedural mechanisms for
delivering this right in a manner crafted to meet the individual needs of
every student with a disability.8 Indeed, the prospect of a federal school
voucher program comes at a time when the rights of students with
disabilities under the IDEA are stronger than ever before. In 2017, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the IDEA merely requires
schools to provide a de minimis education.9 Instead, the Court read the
IDEA as requiring schools to ensure students achieve appropriate progress
in attainment of educational goals.10
This Article argues that existing school voucher programs have a
profound negative effect on students with disabilities, and their parents,
and that any future federal program modeled on state programs would
be similarly detrimental. These parents have two options. One is a
public school education with a legally enforceable guarantee of nondiscrimination and genuine educational advancement. The other is
participation in a voucher program that permits participating schools
to discriminate on the basis of disability—including by simply refusing
to enroll students with a disability. A choice that comes with such a

5. Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special
Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 295–96 (2010) (noting that students with disabilities
are generally seen as having been somehow failed by the public education system).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
7. Id. § 1400(d).
8. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(C)–(H), (c)(9).
9. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
10. Id. at 999 (finding that a student’s Individualized Education Program (IEP)
must be reasonable considering the student’s condition and must allow for progress
in the student’s education).
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price tag is, of course, no true choice at all. For parents whose
children have a disability, in other words, voucher programs’ supposed
freedom of choice is a mirage. Furthermore, school voucher programs
cause funding flight that leaves public schools without the resources
required to adequately provide for the demanding individuated needs
of students with disabilities—further harming students with disabilities
whose parents had no real choice but to keep them in underfunded
public schools.11
This Article argues that a federal school voucher program would
be, from a policy perspective, disastrous for students with disabilities.
Further, this Article contends that, should a federal voucher program
pass, courts should strike down the program as violating the Equal
Protection Clause by discriminating against students with disabilities.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the development
and history of school voucher programs in the United States,
including attempts to use voucher programs as vehicles of statesponsored segregation in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.12
This Part also addresses the challenges that voucher programs have
faced under the religion provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, and the current push for voucher programs by both
state governments and the Trump administration.
In Part II, the Article’s focus switches from voucher programs
specifically to the general policy and legal history of special education
in the United States. This Part points out that in the 1970s, Congress
found millions of children with disabilities were receiving no education
and that millions more were receiving an inadequate education.13 This
crucial finding became the catalyst for modern special education law.
Part III describes in detail the substantive rights for children with
disabilities that were subsequently enacted in federal law, including
the IDEA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section
504),14 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).15 This Part
11. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Betsy DeVos Tweeted a Bizarre Self-Own About
Michigan’s Public Schools, VOX (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/3/13/17112392/devos-michigan-naep-tweet (indicating that a
graph tweeted by Secretary DeVos demonstrates that Michigan public school
performance has significantly declined since Michigan’s school voucher program
redirected funding away from public schools).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (“Before the date of enactment of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-142), the educational needs of
millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met.”).
14. 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 (2012).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
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describes the key provisions of the IDEA, most notably the robust
guarantee of a “free appropriate public education”16 implemented via an
“Individualized Education Program” (IEP).17 This Part then contrasts
the protections of the IDEA, which students with disabilities must forego
to participate in voucher programs, with the far more limited
protections afforded to private school students—especially students
in religious schools, which constitute the vast bulk of schools
participating in voucher programs.
Part III of the Article presents the current Indiana school voucher
program as a case study. The Indiana program has been strongly
endorsed by the Trump administration and is therefore a likely
model for a federal school voucher program.18
Part IV drills down on the detrimental effects that a federal
voucher program would impose on students with disabilities. These
include foregoing their right to a free appropriate public education;
the lack of options for students with disabilities; and the ability of
private schools to refuse admission to students with disabilities.
Moreover, school vouchers would, if used by a student with
disabilities, only cover a fraction of the high tuition charged by the
small minority of private schools that provide adequate support for
children with disabilities. Given these harms, this Article calls for
political resistance to any federal voucher program and argues for
rescinding current state voucher programs.
Finally, Part V of the Article uses these detrimental and disparate
effects as the foundation for arguing that a federal school voucher
program, if enacted, would violate the constitutional rights of
students with disabilities. This Part concludes that the courts should
strike down any federal voucher program as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGALITY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS
School choice has been a controversial and well litigated issue for
decades. In 1925, the Supreme Court held that parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to private schools, including private schools with

16. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
17. Hensel, supra note 5, at 292.
18. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Mike Pence’s Claim that Indiana Has the Largest School
Voucher Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2016/08/12/mike-pences-claim-that-indiana-has-the-largest-school-voucherprogram (noting that Vice President Mike Pence often touts that his home state of
Indiana has the largest voucher program).
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religious affiliations.19 In the ninety years since that decision, the debate
over school choice has continued to permeate discussions about education
in America, largely as part of a greater national conflict20 over “immigration,
religion, race, and national identity.”21
Despite this connection to deep national conflicts, “education is
primarily a state and local responsibility.”22 The federal government,
for example, provides only eight percent of total funding for public
education at the elementary and secondary level.23 The states’
education laws—including school voucher programs—do, of course,
have to comply with the U.S. Constitution.24 The few federal court
challenges to school choice programs have primarily been challenges
that this state involvement in religious education violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.25 At the state level,
many challenges to state-run voucher programs have also centered on
concerns about public funds going to religious schools despite state
statutory and constitutional provisions that govern the state’s
responsibility to educate its children.26 Notwithstanding the success of
such challenges, vouchers are gaining popularity across the country.27
A. The History and Legality of Voucher Programs
The origins of school voucher programs demonstrate the paradox
between theory and reality. The free market economist, Milton Friedman
was the first to explore the concept of school voucher programs.28
Friedman conceptualized a school voucher program in which the
19. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
20. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 816–19 (2011) (describing the conflict between
the movement towards compulsory education and private, religious education).
21. Id. at 818.
22. The
Federal
Role
in
Education,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last modified May 25, 2017).
23. Id. The eight percent includes funds from the Department of Education, the
Department of Health and Human Services for the Head Start Program, and the
Department of Agriculture for the School Lunch Program. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
25. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07 (1971) (invalidating state
statutes that reimbursed or supplemented secular teachers’ salaries and reimbursed
nonpublic schools for secular materials); Minow, supra note 20, at 829.
26. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4.
27. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
28. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 4.
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government gives parents public funds to enroll their child in a school
of their choosing, public or private.29 He theorized that this program
would improve schools by increasing market competition.30 Under his
model, the government’s role in education is limited to disbursal of
funds and “assuring that the schools met certain minimum standards.”31
As Friedman fervently advocated for school vouchers, southern
states started to use the concept as a means to avoid court ordered
desegregation.32 For example, in Virginia, Prince Edward County
ultimately “chose to close its entire public school system in 1959
rather than operate integrated schools.”33 While the County’s schools
were locked, white children used public funds to attend the all-white,
private, Prince Edward Academy through a state-adopted “tuition
grant program.”34 For five years, most of the County’s 1700 black children
had no educational opportunities until the Supreme Court finally held
the closure of all public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.35
Even after Prince Edward County was ordered to re-open the schools,
it used vouchers to perpetuate segregation36 and spent twice the amount
of funding on “tuition grants” as it did on court-mandated integrated
schools.37 Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Eastern

29. See id.; see also Kevin Carey, Dismal Voucher Results Surprise Researchers as DeVos Era
Begins, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/
upshot/dismal-results-from-vouchers-surprise-researchers-as-devos-era-begins.html (quoting
Friedman’s essay, which argues that “the government should pay for all children to go to
school” through vouchers given to parents for “approved educational services”).
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4.
31. Id.
32. Minow, supra note 20, at 822 (adding that white Southerners used both
school choice and anti-Brown associations to evade integration).
33. Chris Ford et al., The Racist Origins of Private School Vouchers, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (July 12, 2017, 11:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
education-k-12/reports/2017/07/12/435629/racist-origins-private-school-vouchers/
(noting that the pushback against Brown and school integration in the South was
known as “massive resistance”).
34. Id.
35. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964); see also Ford et. al, supra
note 33 (discussing the “incredible lengths” black parents undertook to educate their
children due to the school closure).
36. Ford et al., supra note 33.
37. Id. (“The County’s board of supervisors devoted only $189,000 in funding for
integrated public schools. At the same time, they allocated $375,000 that could
effectively only be used by white students for ‘tuition grants to students attending
either private nonsectarian schools in the County or public schools charging tuition
outside the County.’”) (quoting Kara Miles Turner, Both Victors and Victims: Prince
Edward County, Virginia, the NAACP, and ‘Brown’, 90 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2004)).
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District of Virginia held that allowing residents to use state funded voucher
programs to perpetuate segregation violated the U.S. Constitution.38
Although this program was ultimately struck down, Prince Edward
County provided a blueprint for more than 200 southern
communities to use public money to establish “private segregation
academies.”39 More than 200 private segregation academies were
established across the South by 1969.40 In the 1970–1971 school year,
nearly 75,000 students in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi alone
attended segregation academies, which were made possible through
public funds.41 The federal government initially led the charge
against these segregation academies by challenging their operation
under the Civil Rights Act of 196442 and the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965.43
Despite the risk of re-segregating the American education system,
current supporters of voucher programs argue that vouchers are “an
instrument of educational opportunity” that properly promote
religious freedom.44 In the 1990s, school choice advocates joined
forces with religious institutions which argued that the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause analysis of voucher programs was
“unfair and unpredictable.”45 Federal courts had previously held that
the Establishment Clause prohibited public funds from reimbursing
private schools for secular textbooks and salaries46 and from authorizing
tax cuts or deductions for private school tuition.47 So a newly formed

38. Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969).
Notably, the District Court rejected arguments that the constitutional violation
required restitution grants or even termination of vouchers in that school year. Id. at 1182.
39. Ford et al., supra note 33.
40. Id.
41. See ROBERT E. ANDERSON JR., THE SOUTH AND HER CHILDREN: SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 1970–1971 79 (1971).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012); Ford et al., supra note 33.
44. Minow, supra note 20, at 829–32.
45. Id. at 830.
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07, 613–14 (1971) (finding that the
relationship between the states and religious private schools through these programs
involved “excessive entanglement between government and religion”).
47. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797, 798
(1973) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that New York’s aid provision had a
“primary effect that advances religion and offends the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion”); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825,
827–28 (1973) (finding a Pennsylvania program reimbursing private school tuition to
parents through public funds is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause).
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coalition sought to reframe the voucher program debate around the
free exercise of religion.48
Leading reformers filed amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton,49 arguing
that by preventing religious private schools from receiving public
funds, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions contravened the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.50 The Supreme Court, in a
5–4 decision, held that public employees could provide remedial
education at parochial schools so long as this “aid is allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion.”51 The Supreme Court did not expressly address the Free
Exercise Clause. Rather, it applied the Establishment Clause,
concluding that the proper inquiry is “whether the government acted
with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion.”52 Five years
later, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,53 the Court held voucher programs
do not violate the Establishment Clause when they (1) are “neutral with
respect to religion” and (2) “provide[] assistance directly to a broad class
of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly
as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice.”54
Although the Supreme Court held that vouchers did not run afoul
of the religion clauses of U.S. Constitution,55 several high state courts
have struck down voucher programs under state constitutional
provisions. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down a
voucher program under Article 3 of the Vermont State Constitution,
which prohibits, in pertinent part, any individual from being
compelled to “support any place of worship.”56 The Vermont Supreme
Court reasoned that “with no restrictions on the purpose or use of the
tuition funds,” the program violated Article 3 by compelling taxpayers
to support religious institutions through the use of public funds to pay
tuition at private religious schools.57 Furthermore, in 2006, the Florida
Supreme Court struck down the state’s voucher program for violating
Article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida State Constitution, which created a
state mandate to provide public education to all Florida children

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Minow, supra note 20, at 830.
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Brief Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society at 6–15, Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (No. 96-552).
Felton, 521 U.S. at 230–32.
Id. at 222–23 (emphasis added).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 652.
Id.
Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 547 (Vt. 1999).
Id. at 563.
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through a state-run school system.58 The Florida Supreme Court found
that the voucher program diverted state resources to the education of
children within the state “through means other than a system of free
public schools.”59 Finally, in 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court also held
that a program diverting public funds to education savings accounts to
be used for private school tuition subverts the state’s constitutional
provisions requiring funding for public.”60
In addition to provisions mandating the creation of public
education systems, nearly forty state constitutions61 contain “Blaine

58. Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides: “The education
of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is,
therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be
made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free
public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the
establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and
other public education programs that the needs of the people may require . . . .”
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006).
59. Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 407.
60. Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 891 (Nev. 2016) (en banc). Article 11, Section 2
of the Nevada State Constitution provides: “The legislature shall provide for a uniform
system of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each
school district at least six months in every year, and any school district which shall allow
instruction of a sectarian character therein may be deprived of its proportion of the
interest of the public school fund during such neglect or infraction, and the legislature
may pass such laws as will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school
district upon said public schools.” NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
61. The following is a list of the forty states and their respective Blaine provisions: (1) ALA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 263; (2) ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; (3) ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; id. art. IX,
§ 10; (4) ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; (5) CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 8, 9(f); id. art. XVI, § 5; (6)
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; (7) DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; (8) FLA. CONST. art I, § 3; (9) GA. CONST.
art. I, § 2, para. 7; (10) HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; (11) IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §§ 5, 6; (12) ILL.
CONST. art. X, § 3; (13) IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; (14) KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c); (15) KY. CONST.
§ 189; (16) MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; id. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2; (17) MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4;
id. art. VIII, § 2; (18) MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; (19) MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 208; (20) MO.
CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. IX, § 8; (21) MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; (22) NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11;
(23) NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 9, 10; (24) N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII; (25) N.M. CONST.
art. XII, § 3; id. art. XXI, § 4; (26) N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; (27) N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5;
(28) OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; (29) OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; id. art. II, § 5; id. art. XI, § 5; (30)
OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; (31) PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 15, 29; (32) S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; (33) S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; id. art. VIII, § 16; id. art. XXII, para. 4; (34) TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art.
VII, § 5(c); (35) UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. III, § 4; id. art. X, §§ 1, 9; (36) VA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 16; id. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11; (37) WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; id. art. IX, § 4; id. art. XXVI, para. 4;
(38) W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; (39) WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; id. art. X, §§ 3, 6; (40) WYO.
CONST. art. I, § 19; id. art. III, § 36; id. art. VII, § 8; id. art. XXI, § 28.
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Amendments.”62 Although the language of these provisions varies
slightly, Blaine Amendments prohibit states from distributing public
education funds to religious schools.63 Although Blaine’s proposed
amendment failed at the national level, Congress began encouraging
existing states to adopt similar provisions, and conditioned statehood
on states including similar provisions in their new constitutions.64
While Blaine Amendments have been the basis of several legal
challenges to school choice, only a few states’ high courts have
invalidated voucher programs under these provisions. In 2009, for
example, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down two state voucher
programs, one created for students with disabilities and the other for
foster children, for violating Arizona’s Blaine provision.65 In 2015, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that a local school district’s voucher
program violated Colorado’s version of the Blaine Amendment.66
Furthermore, the Supreme Courts of Florida and Nevada each declined to
address the challenges brought under the Blaine provisions of those states,
deciding instead on the education mandate provisions discussed above.67
62. These provisions are named for Representative James Blaine of Maine, who
proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mark Edward DeForrest, An
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment
Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 556 (2003). Blaine’s proposed amendment
stated: “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State
for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect,
nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects
or denominations.” Id. (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC.
205 (1875)). Blaine sought to capitalize on President Grant’s agenda for “good
common school education” and attack on “sectarian schools” to purportedly to
protect the separation of Church and State. Id. at 558. In Mitchell v. Helms, the
Supreme Court noted that Grant’s agenda, and the subsequent Blaine Amendment,
arose from “pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church . . . and it was an open secret
that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’” 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (citing Steven K.
Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992)). See generally
DeForrest, supra note 62, at 558–65. Ultimately, after significant debate, the proposed
amendment fell short of the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the Senate. Id. at 569–73.
63. DeForrest, supra note 62, at 573–74.
64. Mercedes Schneider, The Testing of States’ Blaine Amendments—No Public
Funding of Religious Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 5, 2017, 11:10 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-testing-of-states-blaine-amendments-nopublic_us_58bcdaf7e4b02eac8876d08a.
65. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180, 1185 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting
ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 10).
66. Colorado State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325, 2325 (2017).
67. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 408–09 (Fla. 2006); Schwartz v. Lopez,
382 P.3d 886, 902 (Nev. 2016) (en banc).
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On the other hand, the Indiana and Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld voucher programs against Blaine Amendment challenges.
Echoing the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, the Indiana and Oklahoma Supreme Courts reasoned that
parents and students, not private religious schools, were the direct
beneficiaries of the public funds and were able to make an
independent choice about where to spend those funds.68 Despite this
mixed record, voucher proponents, including Secretary DeVos’s nonprofit,69 have vilified state Blaine provisions as antiquated, bigoted, and
contrary to educational and religious freedom.70
In 2017, the Supreme Court gave voucher proponents a significant
boost when it held that a policy of Missouri’s Department of Natural
Resources—based on the state’s Blaine provision—violated the Free
Exercise Clause.71 Some members of the Court tried to narrow the
opinion by including a footnote that states: “This case involves
express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding
or other forms of discrimination.”72 However, this footnote did not
carry the weight of the majority; although Chief Justice Roberts
authored the majority opinion, he, Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Thomas explicitly dissented from that part of the decision.73
Moreover, on the following day, the Court vacated and remanded the
Colorado Supreme Court decision striking down a voucher program
under Colorado’s Blaine provision for further consideration in light

68. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d. 1213, 1226 (Ind. 2013). Notably, the Indiana
Supreme Court found that the voucher program did not violate educational
mandates in the Indiana Constitution, contrary to the Florida and Nevada decisions,
because the State General Assembly had “broad discretion” about how to fulfill this
obligation. Id.; Oliver v. Hofmeister, 368 P.3d 1270, 1277 (Okla. 2016).
69. See James G. Blaine: Who Was He, and How is He Affecting Children’s Education
Today?, EDCHOICE (May 24, 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/james-g-blaineaffecting-childrens-education-today (chastising “opponents of educational freedom” for
using these “antiquated and historically bigoted amendments” to “thwart” school choice).
70. DeForrest, supra note 62, at 625; Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the
Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious Options from School Choice Programs, 18
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 48, 50 (2017); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 118 (2000); Richard D. Komer & Clark Neily, School
Choice and State Constitutions: A Guide to Designing School Choice Programs INST. FOR JUST.
& AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL 4 (2007), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
school_choice/50statereport/50stateSCreport.pdf.
71. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017).
72. Id. at 2024 n.3.
73. Id. at 2025–26.
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of Trinity Lutheran.74 Thus, the case “may very well open the door” to
voucher programs that include religious entities.75
B. The Current Push for Voucher Programs
As of the 2017–2018 school year, there are twenty-six active
state-funded voucher programs across fifteen states and the District of
Columbia.76 Many of these states have more than one program. For
example, in Ohio, there are five different voucher programs.77 Some
of Ohio’s programs are statewide and serve a particular student
population, such as students with autism, while other programs cover
local areas within Ohio.78 Of the fifteen states with school voucher
programs, three allow only “Town Tuitioning Programs,” which
provide public funds for students who live in a town without a public
school to attend either a public school in another town or a nonreligious private school.79 The voucher programs of the remaining

74. Colorado State Bd. of Educ. v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2325, 2325 (2017).
On remand, the Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot at the request of both
parties after a newly-elected school board voted to end the voucher program. Erica Meltzer,
The Douglas County Voucher Case is Finally over, CHALKBEAT (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2018/01/26/the-douglas-county-voucher-case-is-finallyover; Marianne Goodland, Douglas County School Board Ends Controversial Voucher Program,
COLORADOPOLITICS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://coloradopolitics.com/douglas-county-school-boardends-controversial-voucher-program.
75. See William S. Koski, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer Decision: What Does It
Mean for School Vouchers?, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (July 4, 2017),
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/07/04/trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer-decisionwhat-does-it-mean-for-school-vouchers (arguing “Trinity Lutheran should provide
cause for concern among those who oppose school vouchers generally and those
who oppose vouchers for religious schools specifically”); Frank Ravitch, Symposium:
Trinity Lutheran and Zelman—Saved by Footnote 3 or a Dream Come True for Voucher
Advocates?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2017, 10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017
/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-church-v-comer-zelman-v-simmons-harris-savedfootnote-3-dream-come-true-voucher-advocates.
76. School Choice: School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.
org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/#map-overlay (last modified June 26,
2018) [hereinafter Dashboard]. As of February 2018, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin all have voucher programs. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. These states are Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Id.; School Choice:
New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org
/school-choice/programs/new-hampshire-town-tuitioning-program (last visited Aug.
17, 2018) [hereinafter New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program]. New Hampshire
added this program for the 2017 school year and data is not available yet, but in
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twelve states, require students to: (1) be in a low-income family; (2)
attend or be slated to attend a low performing school; (3) have an
identified disability; (4) be in an active-duty military family; or (5) be in
foster care.80 For some voucher programs, students are eligible if they
satisfy one of these factors;81 in other programs, students are only eligible
if they satisfy two or more of these factors.82 Less than half of the
voucher programs require a student be enrolled in a public school
before receiving a voucher, but most provide a variety of ways to waive
this requirement.83 Furthermore, there are generally only minimal
requirements for private schools to participate in the program. A
school must prove financial stability, secure accreditation by the state or
an approved accrediting agency, and participate in state assessments.84
Of the twenty-six voucher programs, half are specifically tailored to
students with identified disabilities.85 Some of these programs are
designed to address a particular disability, such as autism or dyslexia,86
but most are generally available to students with any disability identified

Maine and Vermont only 3% and 4% of students statewide are eligible for Town
Tuitioning Programs. Id; Dashboard, supra note 76.
80. School Choice: Vouchers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/
research/education/school-choice-vouchers (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
81. School Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/voucher-law-comparison (last visited Aug.
17, 2018) [hereinafter School Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison] (showing that
Vermont’s Town Tuitioning Program only requires that the student live in a district
where there is no operating school).
82. Id. (stating Oklahoma’s Lindsey Nicole Henry Students with Disabilities
Scholarship Program requires that the student with a disability have an IEP and have
attended a public school during the previous school year).
83. Id. (stating that Arkansas waives the requirement if the student’s parent is in
the military on active duty, and that North Carolina does not apply this requirement
to a student that is in foster care).
84. Josh Cunningham, Interactive Guide to School Choice Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGIS. (June 15, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/interactiveguide-to-school-choice.aspx [hereinafter School Choice Laws].
85. Some programs include: Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarships for Students
with Disabilities Program, Georgia’s Special Needs Scholarship Program, Louisiana’s
School Choice Program for Certain Students with Exceptionalities, Mississippi’s
Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship for Students with Dyslexia Program, and Wisconsin’s
Special Needs Scholarship Program. Dashboard, supra note 76.
86. School Choice: Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship for Students with Dyslexia
Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/mississippidyslexia-therapy-scholarship-for-students-with-dyslexia-program (last visited Aug. 17,
2018); School Choice: Ohio—Autism Scholarship Program, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.
org/school-choice/programs/ohio-autism-scholarship-program (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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under federal law.87 Yet, to accept a voucher, these programs require
parents to waive their child’s rights under federal law.88 The majority of
these specialized programs also have fewer accountability requirements
for participating private schools than the general voucher programs
because they do not require students to take state assessments.89 Three
of these programs explicitly create segregated educational systems for
students with disabilities by requiring the funds be spent at schools with
specialized instruction.90 Thus, these programs mandate that students
with disabilities attend a specialized private school, which means that
they will be at a school with only other students with disabilities.
Therefore, these students with disabilities will be separated from—and
unable to interact with—students without disabilities. Separate schools for
students with disabilities is the very essence of segregation on the basis of
disability.

87. See e.g., School Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison, supra note 81 (listing
student eligibility requirements for voucher programs by state). Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah all list
having an IEP or “certain disabilities” as a characteristic making a student eligible for
the state’s respective voucher program. Id.
88. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Nat’l Disability Policy: A Progress Report 60 (2012).
Although the NCD articulated several concerns regarding special voucher programs in
this report, “[c]hief among these is that once students with disabilities use a voucher to
attend a private school, they and their family relinquish rights under the IDEA . . . .” Id.
89. See e.g., School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “LA”
on interactive map). Louisiana’s general voucher program requires participating
schools to administer an assessment to all voucher recipients, but they cannot
administer standardized tests.
The North Carolina Opportunity Scholarship
Program requires that participating schools be accredited by a state or approved
agency and administer state or approved national assessment, and allows schools to
charge voucher students more tuition than non-voucher students. Id. (follow
hyperlink; then click on “NC” on interactive map). North Carolina Special
Education Scholarship Grants for Children with Disabilities only requires
participating schools to: (1) meet with health and safety regulations and (2) comply
with state and federal antidiscrimination laws. Id.
90. See id. (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on interactive map). Mississippi
has two special education school voucher programs: the Nate Rogers Scholarship for
Students with Disabilities Program and the Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship
for Students with Dyslexia Program. Id. These programs require that instruction be
provided by a certified speech therapy pathologist or a licensed dyslexia therapist,
respectively, by implication this means these students will be educated in segregated
environments. Id. Additionally, Louisiana’s School Choice Program for Certain
Students with Exceptionalities requires participating schools “must have been in
operation and providing special education for at least two years.” Id. Consequently
they are filtering these students out of the integrated public school system and into a
segregated private system. Id. (follow hyperlink; then click “LA” on interactive map).
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However, proponents of special education voucher programs argue
that the programs allow dissatisfied parents an easier way to leave a
public school than through the processes set forth under federal
disabilities laws.91 These voucher advocates minimize the waiver of
federal disability law protections, specifically the IDEA, equating it to
waiving the right to use public school facilities, such as the school
cafeteria.92 These arguments gloss over the significant procedural
safeguards, due process rights, and school accountability contained in
the IDEA.93 Additionally, supporters argue that these programs also save
money by preserving resources that would otherwise be otherwise be spent
on litigation.94 Like most voucher advocates, these supporters tout freedom
of choice and emphasize failures of the current educational system.95
On the other hand, opponents argue that many of these special
education voucher proponents have another legislative agenda: the
advancement of general education voucher programs.96 These opponents
contend that children with disabilities have become “poster children
for the voucher movement because it is difficult politically to argue
against benefits that will serve this vulnerable group.”97 National school
choice organizations and religious organizations have both lobbied state
legislators to pass special education voucher programs.98 It is evident that
these organizations use special needs as a front to pass voucher legislation,
91. Hensel, supra note 5, at 294–95; Stuart Buck, Special Education Vouchers Are
Beneficial: A Response to Hensel, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 651, 654–56, 659 (2012); see also Can
School Choice Help Students with Special Needs?, CHILDREN’S EDUC. SERVS. (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.ces-schools.net/can-school-choice-help-students-special-needs
(discussing purported “Myths” and “Facts” regarding vouchers for students with
disabilities). The Children’s Educational Services asserts as “Fact” that “[e]vidence
indicates that private schools better serve many students with special needs” because
of studies into parent reported satisfaction with voucher programs. Id. These studies
are tainted because private schools are not required to complete objective
assessments and other accountability measures. Rather private school academic
reports are subjective and they have an incentive to provide good reports to keep
students enrolled. Hensel, supra note 5, at 334–35. “In Florida, for example, there
are reports of McKay scholarship students who received high grades in private
schools only to find that they were several grade levels behind when returning to
public school.” Id. at 335.
92. See Buck, supra note 91, at 659 (stating that parents who use private school
vouchers are free to return their children to public schools, at which time all of their
rights will reappear).
93. See discussion infra Section III.B.
94. Hensel, supra note 5, at 295.
95. See generally Buck, supra note 91, at 653–60.
96. Hensel, supra note 5, at 295–96.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 296–97.
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since legislatures enacting special education voucher program immediately
introduced bills for universal school choice.99
Additionally, several key disability advocacy groups oppose voucher
programs,100 which stands in stark contrast to the voucher
proponents’ narrative that these programs offer parents better
choices to suit their children’s needs.101 Most notably, the National
Council on Disability (NCD)102 highlighted several concerns about
special education voucher programs in its 2012 report to President
Obama and Congress.103 In the report, the NCD noted “several areas
of concern.” The NCD reported that private schools accepting
vouchers (1) require students relinquish their rights under the IDEA;
(2) have higher tuition than the dollar amount vouchers cover; (3)
have a history of refusing admission to students with disabilities; and
(4) lack a “demonstrable commitment to the IDEA principle of
accountability in results.”104 To address the detrimental effects these
programs have on students with disabilities, the NCD made two
recommendations. First, recipients of vouchers should not be required
to forfeit their rights under the IDEA and schools that accept state
funds should be mandated to publish assessment scores, graduation

99. Id.
100. See Wendy F. Hensel, Recent Developments in Voucher Programs for Students with
Disabilities, 59 LOY. L. REV. 323, 351–53 (2013); see also Milwaukee Voucher Schools Still
Discriminate Against Students with Disabilities, ACLU OF WIS. (July 19, 2015),
http://www.aclu-wi.org/media/milwaukee-voucher-schools-still-discriminate-againststudents-disabilities (discussing continued discrimination after ACLU filed complaint
with the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division because students with
disabilities were told not to apply for vouchers because the schools could not serve
them, or, if admitted, did not provide the support and accommodations these
students required); AGAINST House Bill 1335, “Special Education Vouchers,” RAISE YOUR
HAND TEX. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.raiseyourhandtexas.org/key-issues/
testimony/house-bill-1335-special-education-vouchers (testimony of Dr. Ann Smisko
before the Texas House Committee on Public Education against special education
vouchers); Vouchers, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTYS & ADVOCS., INC., http://www.copaa.org
/page/Voucher (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (recommending against vouchers
because “[f]ar too many students are being forced to relinquish important civil rights
in order to access public education funds”).
101. See CHILDREN’S EDUC. SERVS., supra note 91 (purporting to address the “myth”
that “private schools cannot serve and exclude students with special needs”).
102. The NCD is an independent federal agency tasked with annual reporting “on
the nation’s progress in achieving our national disability policy goals. NAT’L COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 1. The national disability policy goals are “equality of
opportunity, independent living, full participation and economic self-sufficiency for
an estimated 54 million Americans with disabilities.” Id.
103. Id. at 60–61.
104. Id.
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rates, and other outcomes concerning disabled students. students with
disabilities.105 The NCD cautioned that publicly-funded vouchers
should not be used to create a “segregated educational system for students
with disabilities.”106 Second, the NCD called on the Department of
Education (ED) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue
guidance “to clarify the civil rights violations that may be linked to
creating a publicly financed . . . segregated educational system for
students with disabilities,” including the creation of programs that
segregate “on the basis of a specific disability or disability status more
generally.”107 As of 2018, neither department has acted on this request.108
C. Support for Federally Funded Vouchers
Under the Trump Administration
Like many of the Trump administration’s other first-term
priorities, the push to create a federally funded school voucher
program began as a promise on the campaign trail.109 Although thencandidate Trump was “all over the map” during the campaign on
educational policies, his “signature education proposal” was to
provide $20 billion in federal funds to support a national voucher
program with income-based eligibility.110
To demonstrate this
commitment, President Trump nominated Betsy DeVos to lead the
Department of Education (ED) although she never attended a public
school, nor sent her own children to public schools. Secretary DeVos
is a billionaire who spent decades lobbying for the expansion of
taxpayer funded voucher programs.111
Throughout its first year, the Trump administration continued
efforts to divert public funds to school choice programs. In his first
ever speech to Congress as President, Trump called for an education

105. Id. at 61.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. NCLD Policy Team, President’s FY19 Budget Doesn’t Add Up to Student Success,
NCLD
(2018),
https://www.ncld.org/archives/action-center/what-we-ve-done/
presidents-fy19-budget-doesnt-add-up-to-student-success.
109. Stephanie Saul, Where Donald Trump Stands on School Choice, Student Debt and
Common Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21
/us/where-trump-stands-on-school-choice-student-debt-and-common-core.html;
Trump Promise Checker, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/politics/trump-promise-tracker [hereinafter Trump Promise Checker].
110. Saul, supra note 109.
111. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION (2010),
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what.html.
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bill that funds school vouchers for disadvantaged youth.112 However,
other acts undertaken by the administration which were perceived to
be more controversial overshadowed the calls for vouchers in the
administration’s first year.113 Furthermore, in her first budget plan
for the ED, Secretary DeVos proposed to shift $1.4 billion from
federal funding of public school to private school vouchers and
“other alternatives to traditional public schools.”114 Although Congress
ultimately rejected this proposal,115 Secretary DeVos has indicated she
will continue to push for a federal voucher program.116
Secretary DeVos has also made it clear through her public remarks
as Secretary of Education that she believes school vouchers are the
best option for students with disabilities.117 This comes as no surprise;
the voucher lobby organizations she launched and worked with
previously have lobbied for special needs vouchers programs as part

112. Yamiche Alcindor, Trump’s Call for School Vouchers is a Return to a Campaign
Pledge, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/us/
politics/trump-school-vouchers-campaign-pledge.html.
113. Tessa Berenson, Here Are the Promises President Trump Kept and Broke in His First
Year, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5106302/donald-trump-first-year-promises.
114. Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Seeks to Slash Education Department
but Make Big Push for School Choice, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-seeks-to-slash-educationdepartment-but-make-big-push-for-school-choice/2017/03/15/63b8b6f8-09a1-11e7-b77c0047d15a24e0_story.
115. Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Congress Rejects Much of Betsy
DeVos’s Agenda in Spending Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/education/wp/2018/03/21/congress-rejects-much-of-betsy-devoss-agenda-inspending-bill.
116. See Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Allies See New Obstacle to School Choice Efforts:
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/us/
politics/betsy-devos-school-choice-vouchers-trump.html (remarking how DeVos has
reassured her supporters that she has not been deterred); Kimberly Hefling & Caitlin
Emma, How Betsy DeVos Softened her Message on School Choice, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018,
7:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/betsy-devos-school-choiceeducation-397633 (discussing how DeVos is deliberately softening rhetoric on school
choice to avoid detractors); see also Stahl, supra note 1 (stating that Secretary DeVos is
striving for parents to be able to choose where to send their children to school);
Erica L. Green, In Her Words: Education Secretary Betsy DeVos Assesses a Year on the Job,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/politics/betsydevos.html (discussing how Secretary DeVos has not stopped fighting for the
expansion of school choice).
117. See Valerie Strauss, The Deep Irony in Betsy DeVos’s First Speech on Special
Education, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/answer-sheet/wp/2017/07/18/the-deep-irony-in-betsy-devoss-first-speech-on-special
-education (noting that Secretary DeVos ignored that most special education children
attend public schools, which lack needed resources, and instead focused on school choice).
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of their broader agenda.118 Ironically, Secretary DeVos championed
the parents involved in the 2017 Supreme Court decision on the
IDEA for their “courage” to enroll their son in a private school while
touting the importance of school choice programs.119 In reality, if these
parents had accepted a voucher instead of enforcing their son’s rights
under the IDEA, they would have waived the right to litigate the issue and
receive compensation for the entire cost of the private school tuition.120
Thus, despite being championed as a free-market solution to the
education of American children, vouchers have an ugly history in this
country. The Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that these
programs do not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution and recently
indicated it will not uphold state Blaine provisions that state courts
previously used to invalidate voucher programs. And, therefore, in
the current climate, a federally funded voucher program will likely
survive any challenges based on the separation of church and state.
II. SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICY AND LEGAL HISTORY
Over the past thirty years, the number of children requiring special
education services in the United States has risen by over two million.121
This is largely due to the increase in identified developmental
disabilities.122 As a result, by 2015, 6.7 million children, or thirteen
percent of all public school students in America, received special
education services.123 These children enjoy a right to education
under federal law;124 however, special education voucher programs
require children with disabilities to effectively waive these rights upon
accepting a voucher because private schools are not accountable to
the same federal disability laws as public schools. This section

118. Background on Betsy DeVos from the ACLU of Michigan, ACLU OF MICH.,
https://www.aclu.org/other/background-betsy-devos-aclu-michigan (last visited Aug.
17, 2018); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 61.
119. Strauss, supra note 117.
120. See infra Section III.
121. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHILDREN AND YOUTH WITH
DISABILITIES tbl. 204.30, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp (last
visited Aug. 17, 2018) (stating that the number of students who received special
education services increased from 4,144,000 in the 2001–2002 school year to
6,677,000 in the 2015–2016 school year).
122. Id. (“In school year 2015–2016, a higher percentage of students ages [three][twenty-one] received special education services under the IDEA for specific learning
disabilities [thirty-four percent] than for any other type of disability.”).
123. Id.
124. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (ensuring that all children with
disabilities have access to free and appropriate public education).

1818

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1673

provides a brief history of federal laws governing education, a
discussion of special education law, an analysis of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the law, and an examination of how these
laws are significantly limited in the realm of privatized education.
A. The Origins of Federal Special Education Policy
For most of the twentieth century, public school children with
disabilities were denied legal protection. In 1954, the Supreme Court
made the groundbreaking declaration that separating children of
different races in public education is “inherently unequal.”125 However,
it took another twenty years for the federal courts to address the
exclusion of children with disabilities from public school systems across
America.126 Before the courts and Congress finally addressed the issue
in the 1970s, millions of children with disabilities received little
access—and often no access at all—to educational opportunities.127 In
1967, state institutions housed nearly 200,000 individuals with
disabilities.128
These institutions provided “only minimal food,
clothing, and shelter,” and no education or rehabilitation services.129
In 1970, only one in five children with a disability was educated at a
public school.130 Many states excluded all children who were blind,
While
deaf, emotionally disturbed, or intellectually disabled.131
Congress passed laws increasing educational opportunities for children
with disabilities throughout the 1950s and 1960s,132 it was the federal
courts that brought truly significant change in the early 1970s.133 In
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, a federal
district court held for the first time that children with intellectual
disabilities who have been excluded from public education have a

125. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
126. The IDEA 40th Anniversary, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/osers/idea40 (last modified Dec. 1, 2015) (celebrating President
Ford signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (Pub. L. 94-142) into
law on November 29, 1975).
127. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 3 (2010) [hereinafter THIRTY-FIVE YEARS].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 4 (listing legislative efforts including the Training of Professional
Personnel Act of 1959 (Pub. L. 86-158), the Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961 (Pub. L. 87276), and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-10)).
133. Id. at 5.
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colorable due process claim.134 The panel concluded that excluding
students with disabilities from public schools created “such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard.”135
Later that year, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the D.C. Board of Education violated the Due
Process Clause when it expelled students with disabilities without a
prior hearing.136 In support of its holding,137 the district court quoted
lengthy passages from both Brown v. Board of Education138 and Bolling
v. Sharpe.139 The judge evoked the Supreme Court’s reasoning that
education “must be made available to all on equal terms”140 because
to do otherwise imposes on the excluded children “an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.”141
In the wake of these decisions, Congress began examining the plight
of children with disabilities in the American education system.142 The
investigation found that millions of children were not receiving an
appropriate education, resulting in long-term societal costs.143 The
investigation found that:
of the more than 8 million children . . . with [disabilities] requiring
special education and related services, only 3.9 million such children
are receiving an appropriate education. 1.75 million [children with
disabilities] are receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million
[children with disabilities] are receiving an inappropriate education.144
134. Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“We begin with the contention that due process requires a
hearing before retarded children may be denied a public education. It is not disputed that
prior to this suit, parents of retarded children who are plaintiffs were not afforded a hearing
or, in many instances, even notice of their child’s exclusion from public school.”).
135. Id. at 295 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971)) (holding
that it was a due process violation for the police to post a notice at all retail liquor
establishments forbidding sales to a Mrs. Constantineau because of her “excessive drinking”).
136. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
children labeled as “behavioral problems, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed
or hyperactive” have a right to publicly supported education).
137. Id. at 874–75.
138. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
140. 348 F. Supp. at 875 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
141. Id. (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500).
142. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7 (1975) (explaining that the Senate investigation
will help ensure that new federal legislation “will result in maximum benefits to
[children with disabilities] and their families”).
143. Id. at 9–10; see also PETER W.D. WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR WRIGHT, WRIGHTSLAW:
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 2007).
144. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (emphasis added).
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The investigation further determined that, at best, it would cost
taxpayers billions of dollars to maintain the children who were not
being educated “in a minimally acceptable lifestyle.”145 Furthermore,
Congress determined that these children may be “needlessly . . .
forced into institutional settings” where “billions of dollars are
expended each year to maintain persons in these subhuman
conditions.”146 In response, Congress passed the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA),147 the first iteration of what
later became the IDEA, which codified the right to a free appropriate
public education for every child with a disability across the country.148
B. The Substantive Rights for Children with Disabilities in Federal Law
This section will first briefly describe federal protections for
individuals with disabilities that intersect with education. Next, this
section will discuss the rights bestowed by the IDEA on students with
disabilities in public schools, and the IDEA’s process for resolving
disputes about whether schools are respecting those rights. This
section will then explain the crucial differences between the IDEA
protections, and those provided by section 504 and the ADA. This
section will also describe the extent these federal disability laws apply
to private elementary and secondary schools.
1.

Federal protections for individuals with disabilities that intersect with
education
A year before Congress directly addressed disability discrimination in
public education, it sought to protect individuals with disabilities from
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id.
147. Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94–142 § 3(c),
89 Stat 733 (1975) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012)). To improve the
lack of access to education identified by Congress, EAHCA set forth four primary
purposes of federal special education legislation. Id. First, to assure that children
with disabilities have access to “a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs.” Id. Second, “to assure that the rights of [children with disabilities] and their
parents . . . are protected.” Id. Third, “to assist States and localities to provide for
the education of all [children with disabilities].” Id. Fourth, “to assess and assure the
effectiveness of efforts to educate [children with disabilities].” Id. As the law evolved
through the 1980s and 1990s, provisions were added to govern the following: early
intervention programs and services from birth to the age of three; transition services
and planning from high school to adult living; integration of students with
disabilities into general education classrooms; and disparities in the education of
minority children with disabilities. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 127, at 6–7.
148. Pub. L. 94–142 § 3(c), 89 Stat 733 (1975).
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discrimination by any government agencies or programs receiving
federal funds, by enacting the first major federal legislation to
address disability discrimination in the United States.149 Section 504
prohibits any agency that receives federal funding from discriminating
against qualified persons with disabilities in its employment, programs,
or services.150 It applies to all institutions that receive federal funding,
including public school districts, higher education institutions, and
“other state and local education agencies”.151 However, it does not
protect individuals with disabilities from acts of private discrimination by
private employers, programs, or facilities.152 Disability rights advocates
therefore continued to lobby for more comprehensive legislation.153
Nearly twenty years later, these lobbying edits bore fruit in the form
of the ADA. Modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,154 Congress
passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”155 The regulations under Title II of the ADA prohibit
discrimination by state and local governments, and the regulations
under Title III prohibit discrimination by public accommodations,
including businesses and non-profit service providers.156 Public schools,
as a part of state or local government, are therefore prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of disability under Title II. Moreover, the
Title III definition of public accommodations includes “a nursery,
elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or post-graduate private school,
or other place of education.”157

149. RANDY S. CHAPMAN, THE EVERYDAY GUIDE TO SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: A
HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS, TEACHERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 81 (2d ed. 2008).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (providing that “[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency”).
151. Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and
the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Protecting
Students with Disabilities].
152. § 794(a).
153. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (extending
more comprehensive legal protections to persons with disabilities in 1990).
154. Introduction to the ADA, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Introduction to the ADA].
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
156. Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154.
157. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2017).
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While the ADA contains strong prohibitions against discrimination
by public accommodations, religious entities—including religious
private schools—are exempt from the ADA’s requirements.158 Under
the ADA, a religious entity is defined broadly as “a religious
organization, including a place of worship.”159 According to a 2014
survey by the ED, approximately sixty-nine percent of private schools in
the United States—enrolling roughly 3.6 million students—are
religious and, therefore, exempt from the ADA.160
2.

The IDEA
While section 504 and the ADA provided important prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of disability, neither specifically
addressed disability discrimination in education.
Congress finally
addressed this by passing the IDEA. The IDEA was specifically designed to
combat the pervasive problems of exclusion and segregation inhibiting
access to education for children with disabilities.161 It regulates the
education of children with disabilities to ensure they have the equal access
to public education due to them under the Fourteenth Amendment.162
The IDEA does this in four ways. First, it establishes the core right of a
“free appropriate public education,” (FAPE) and defines associated key
concepts.163 Second, it abrogates state sovereign immunity from
suit.164 Third, the IDEA creates the Office of Special Education
Programs within the ED to administer and carry out its functions and
processes.165 Finally, the IDEA allocates federal funding to supplement
states’ per-pupil spending for students with disabilities.166
The IDEA applies to students who have a qualifying disability.167 The law
ensures children with disabilities have access to meaningful educational
158. § 36.102(e).
159. § 36.104.
160. Statistics About Nonpublic Education in the United States, OFF. OF NON-PUB. EDUC.,
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). In
contrast, of the 31.3% nonsectarian private schools, only 4.8% focus on special education. Id.
161. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 127, at 5–6.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
163. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–01 (2012).
164. § 1403.
165. § 1402.
166. § 1411. Although Congress promised to fund “[forty] percent of the average
cost to educate a child with disabilities” when it initially passed the law in 1975, as of
February 2018, “the Federal Government pays less than half of what it originally
promised in 1975.” NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BROKEN PROMISES: THE UNDERFUNDING
OF IDEA 1 (2018) [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISES].
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)–(B).
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opportunities through a number of requirements and protections. The
IDEA requires schools to provide students with a “least restrictive”
educational environment168 and develop an IEP to address the specific
needs of each qualifying student.169 The IDEA also imposes strict rules
governing suspensions and expulsions of students with a disability.170
Moreover, although the IDEA does not expressly govern private
schools,171 it does impose some responsibilities on public agencies for
children with disabilities that attend private schools.172
a. Key definitions, purpose, and process
The IDEA establishes several key requirements to achieve its mission
of improving educational access for children with disabilities. These
include creating the right to a free appropriate public education
defining who is a “child with a disability.”173 The IDEA’s stated purpose
is ensuring a free appropriate public education for children with
disabilities,174 and defines a “free appropriate public education” as:
special education and related services that—(A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under section 1414(d) of this title.175

The term “child with a disability” refers to any child who (1) has a
disability that falls in one of ten categories,176 and (2) “by reason thereof,
needs special education and related services.”177 For children aged three
through nine, the term may also include a child with any developmental
168. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
169. § 1414(d).
170. § 1415(k).
171. Elementary and Secondary Schools are nonprofit institutional day or
residential schools, including charter schools, that provide the respective level of
education as determined by state law. § 1401(6), (27). Although discussed in the
Act, “private school” is not a defined term. § 1401.
172. § 1401(32) (defining “State educational agency”).
173. § 1401(3), (9).
174. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
175. § 1401(9).
176. The ten categories of disability set forth in the IDEA are: intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance,
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, and
specific learning disabilities. Id. § 1401(3)(A).
177. Id.
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delay that requires “special education and related services” at the
discretion of the State and local educational agency.178
Under the IDEA, school districts and state educational agencies
have an obligation to locate and identify all children with disabilities
in the state through a process called “child find.”179 The initial
evaluation process has two goals. First, the school agency must determine
whether the child has a disability that makes that child eligible for special
education under the IDEA.180 Second, the school agency must establish
the content of the child’s IEP.181 To do this, the school agency must
identify the child’s present levels of performance and the child’s needs in
order to progress in a general education setting or other appropriate
placement.182
Before the initial evaluation takes place, the school must acquire the
written informed consent of the child’s parents.183 The school district is
required to “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather
relevant functional, developmental, and academic information, including
information provided by the parent” in the evaluation process.184 Once the
assessments are completed, a team of professionals and the parents of
the child meet to determine whether the child has a disability under
the IDEA and, if so, the educational needs of the child.185 After the
initial evaluation and commencement of services, the IDEA requires a
school district to re-evaluate the child at least every three years, or
whenever a member of the IEP team186—such as a parent or school
178. Id. § 1401(3)(B).
179. § 1412(a)(3); see also Pamela Wright & Pete Wright, The Child Find Mandate:
What Does It Mean to You?, WRIGHTSLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/child.find.
mandate.htm (last revised Sept. 26, 2007).
180. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
181. Section 1412(a)(4) states that an IEP must meet the eight content
requirements listed § 1436(d).
182. § 1412(a)(4).
183. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I). It is important to note that at this stage, the parent is
consenting to the evaluation only. The school district must receive separate consent
from parents after the IEP is drafted to deliver any special education services.
CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 21.
184. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
185. § 1414(b)(4)(A). Children that are referred before kindergarten are often
evaluated by a “child find team” for the school district, consisting of educational and
therapy professionals like speech pathologists, occupational therapists, and
psychologists that can perform the multi-disciplinary assessments. See Wright &
Wright, supra note 179 (describing the “child find” process for infants and children
under three years of age).
186. Further, the IEP is crafted by an IEP team which must include the parents of
the child with a disability, general and special education professionals, and a
qualified representative for the school district who has knowledge regarding specially
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administrator—requests it.187 The school district must also re-evaluate a
student before the IEP team can determine that the child no longer has a
qualifying disability, which would render that child no longer eligible for
special education, services, and other protections under the IDEA.188
Once a child with a disability has been identified through the initial
evaluation, the IDEA requires that the school provide the child with the
“special education” and other “related services” and support that particular
child needs in order to receive a free appropriate public education. These
requirements are described in the child’s IEP.189 Special education
“means specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet
the unique needs of a child with a disability.”190 The related services
required by the IDEA consist of “transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special education.”191 For example,
suppose a child cannot complete written work because she cannot
properly grip a pencil. Occupational therapy that teaches the student
how to grip a pencil would constitute a supportive service that is required
designed instruction, the general education curriculum, and the school district’s
resources. Other individuals with special knowledge or expertise about the child
may be included on the IEP team at the discretion of the parents or school. For
example, the team could include the student’s private therapist and, whenever
appropriate, the child herself. The statute specifies:
(i) the parents of the child with the disability; (ii) not less than [one]
regular education teacher . . . (if the child is, or may be participating in the
regular [classroom]); (iii) not less than [one] special education
teacher . . . ; (iv) a representative of the local educational agency who is
qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed
instruction . . . is knowledgeable about the general education curriculum,
and is knowledgeable about the availability of resources at the local
educational agency; (v) an individual who can interpret the instructional
implications of evaluation results; and (vi) other individuals with special
knowledge or expertise regarding the child . . . .
§ 1414(d)(1)(B).
187. § 1414(a)(2)(A)–(B).
188. § 1414(c)(5)(A).
189. § 1401.
190. § 1401(29).
191. § 1401(26)(A). The definition provides a comprehensive list of “developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services,” including: “speech-language pathology and
audiology services; interpreting services; psychological services; physical and occupational
therapy; recreation, including therapeutic recreation; social work services; and school
nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate
public education as described in the individualized education program of the child;
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services;
and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only.” Id.
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for the child to benefit from her special education. This occupational
therapy would therefore be part of the specially designed instruction
that the school has to provide under the child’s IEP.
A school district must also provide “supplementary aids and services” to
enable students with disabilities to succeed in general education
classrooms.192 These are “aids, services, and other supports that are
provided in regular education classes or other education-related settings
to enable children with disabilities to be educated with nondisabled
children to the maximum extent appropriate.”193
School districts often provide “supplementary aids and services” in the
form of “accommodations” and “modifications.”194 Although they are
similar, accommodations and modifications serve distinct purposes. A
“modification” changes the curriculum to enable a student to engage
with the same subject matter as the rest of the class at a level appropriate
for that child’s cognitive ability.195 For example, a student in a World
History class may be given a shorter, easier reading assignment about
Ancient Egypt than her peers.196 “Accommodations,” in contrast, are
alterations in the classroom environment, content format, or equipment
which enable a student with a disability to engage with the same curriculum
as the rest of his or her peers.197 Accommodations may include extra time
for testing, sign-language interpretation services, or large print materials.198
A child with a disability may also use an “assistive technology device,” which
is defined as “any item, piece of equipment, or product system . . . that is
used to increase, maintain, or improve functional capabilities of a child with

192. See id. § 1412(a)(5) (requiring that schools receiving financial assistance
place children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment).
193. § 1401(33).
194. See 34 C.F.R § 300.320(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mandating that the IEP be in
writing and contain a description of the supplementary aids and services,
modifications, and accommodations that are necessary for a child with disabilities to
achieve his or her learning objectives).
195. What is the Difference Between Accommodation and Modification for a Student with a
Disability?, DISABILITIES, OPPORTUNITIES, INTERNETWORKING, & TECH. (DO IT) (June 28,
2017), https://www.washington.edu/doit/what-difference-between-accommodation-andmodification-student-disability [hereinafter DO IT].
196. See Erich Strom, The Difference Between Accommodations and Modifications,
UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/learning-attention-issues/treatmentsapproaches/educational-strategies/the-difference-between-accommodations-andmodifications (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (providing examples of accommodations
versus modifications in classroom instruction, classroom tests, standardized testing,
and “special” classes like gym, music, and art).
197. DO IT, supra note 195.
198. See id. (listing computer text-to-speech systems and alternative keyboards as
additional examples of accommodations).
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a disability” as an accommodation.199 For example, a child with a disability
that impairs his handwriting may use the talk-to-text feature on a computer
to complete assignments that are normally handwritten.
The specific mechanism for providing each child with his or her free
appropriate public education is an Individualized Education Plan, or
IEP. The IEP is a detailed and comprehensive document of a student’s
individual educational needs that must include statements of:
(1) the child’s present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance;200
(2) measurable annual goals, including academic and functional
goals;201
(3) description of the child’s progress toward meeting the annual
goals;202
(4) the special education and related services, supplementary aids
and services, and modifications the school will provide the child to
“advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals” and “to
be involved in and make progress in the general education
curriculum . . . and to participate in extracurricular and other
nonacademic activities;203
(5) the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with
nondisabled children in the regular class and extracurricular and
other nonacademic activities;204
(6) any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary
to measure the academic achievement and functional performance
on State and districtwide assessments;205 and
(7) the projected date for the beginning of the services and
modifications . . . and the anticipated frequency, location, and
duration of those services and modifications.206

199. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1)(A) (2012).
200. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). This statement must include how the child’s disability
affects their “involvement and progress in the general education curriculum.”
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa).
201. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II). These goals must be crafted to “meet the child’s
needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and
make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the child’s
other educational needs that result from the child’s disability.” Id.
202. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (requiring that the IEP also establish when
periodic reports on the child’s progress will be issued).
203. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
204. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V).
205. See § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI) (mandating that the IEP also include any
modifications to the standardized testing process, such as taking an alternate
assessment).
206. § 1414(d)(1)(a)(i)(VII).
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Finally, the IDEA outlines which agencies are responsible for
implementing the law at the state and federal level. Because education
systems vary from state to state, the IDEA uses generalized terms to
describe the educational agencies at the local and state level responsible
for providing free appropriate public education to children with
disabilities.207 The “state educational agency” is the state’s highest
governing agency, typically a state department of education, that is
“primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary
schools and secondary schools.”208 The state educational agency is
responsible for ensuring state-wide procedural compliance with the
IDEA and academic achievement consistent with the mission of the
IDEA.209 A “local educational agency,” typically a school district, is a
“public board of education or other public authority legally constituted
within a State” to control or direct “public elementary schools or
secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other
political subdivision of a State.”210 The local educational agency is
primarily responsible for identifying students with disabilities within its
borders and developing and administering IEPs for each student with a
disability who attends a school within its school system.211 “Educational
service agency” is a broad term that encompasses any public administrative
agency authorized by state law to manage and assist local educational
agencies in overseeing a public school.212 At the federal level, the
IDEA is enforced by the ED’s Office of Special Education Programs
(OSEP).213 OSEP is charged with “administering and carrying out [the
IDEA] and other programs and activities concerning the education of
children with disabilities.”214
b. The least restrictive environment requirement
A core tenet of the IDEA is the principle that students with disabilities
have the right to be educated in the “least restrictive environment”—
attending their neighborhood schools and integrating into general

207. See § 1401(19)(A) (defining a “local educational agency” as a public board of
education “or other public authority” involved in directing schools; see also id.
§ 1401(19)(B) (including “any other public institution or agency” directing
education within the definition of an “educational service agency”).
208. § 1401(32).
209. § 1412(11).
210. § 1401(19)(A).
211. § 1412.
212. § 1401(5).
213. § 1402(a).
214. Id.
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education classrooms—to the maximum extent possible.215 Consequently,
a school must first consider providing supplementary services in the
regular classroom before it may separate a student from her peers.216
Circuit courts are split three ways on how to apply the IDEA’s least
restrictive environment mandate. Firstly, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits use a two-part test first enunciated in Daniel R.R. v. Board of
Education.217 Under this test, the court first assesses whether a school
can provide an appropriate education in a regular classroom through
the use of supplemental aids and services. If the court concludes this
is not possible, the court next determines whether the school district
has “mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.”218
In applying the second part of the test, the court considers the
following non-exhaustive factors: first, steps the school district has
taken to accommodate the child in the regular classroom; second,
comparison of the academic benefits the child will receive in the
regular classroom with those she will receive in the special education
classroom; third, the child’s overall regular educational experience,
including non-academic benefits; and finally, the effect that the disabled
student’s presence in the regular classroom will have on that classroom.219
Secondly, the Ninth, Eleventh, and Seventh Circuits use a slight
variant of the Daniel R.R. test. Courts in these circuits apply the twopart test described above, but when applying the second part of the

215. See id. § 1412(5). “To the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” Id. Furthermore, in In L.B. ex rel. K.B. v.
Nebo School District, the Tenth Circuit stated that, “[e]ducating children in the least
restrictive environment in which they can receive an appropriate education is one of
the IDEA’s most important substantive requirements.” 379 F.3d 966, 976 (10th Cir.
2004) (citing Murray v. Monrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 926 (10th Cir. 1995)).
216. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 13. The IDEA provides “[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled,
and special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of
a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A).
217. 874 F.2d 1036, 1048–49 (5th Cir. 1989).
218. L.B., 379 F.3d at 976 (citing Murray v. Montrose Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 926 n.10
(10th Cir. 1995)) (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1989))).
219. Id. (citing Murray, 51 F.3d at 926 n.10; Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204,
1216–17 (3d Cir. 1993); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–50)).
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test, they also balance the educational benefits of the child with a
disability against the cost to the school district of doing so.220
Finally, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits employ a single-part
test for assessing the least restrictive environment requirement. In
these circuits, “[i]n a case where the segregated facility is considered
superior, the court should determine whether the services which
make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a nonsegregated setting.”221 If these services can be provided in a regular
classroom, then placing the student in a separate classroom violates
the least restrictive environment requirement.222
As the Tenth Circuit points out, the test used by the Fourth, Sixth,
and Eighth Circuits only applies when the segregated facility is
considered superior, and is therefore at odds with the mission of the
IDEA.223 Thus, the majority of Circuits appropriately use the Daniel
R.R. test and accompanying factors to determine if a school district
has complied with the least restrictive environment mandate.
c.

The Individualized Education Program

The next vital component of the IDEA are the specific requirements
that govern the process of creating and documenting an IEP. As
discussed above, the IEP must include several components that capture
the child’s current abilities and goals for the next academic year.224
When developing the IEP, the team must consider the child’s
strengths, the parents’ concerns for “enhancing the education of their
child,” the child’s most recent evaluation by the school district, and
“the academic, developmental, and functional needs of the child.”225
The IEP must include a description of the supplementary aids and
services that the school will provide for the student, along with any
modifications or accommodations.226
The IDEA also sets forth clear guidelines regarding the IEP for
transfer students, both within the same state and from out of state;227
220. See id. at 976–77 (referencing Sch. Dist. of Wis. Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671
(7th Cir. 2002); Sacramento City Unified Sch. District v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1994); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991)).
221. DeVries v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. N.W. R-1
Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
222. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
223. See id. (noting that, alternatively, the Daniel R.R. test is applicable in all cases
and conforms with the language and goals of IDEA).
224. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (2012).
225. § 1414(d)(3)(A).
226. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
227. § 1414(b)(3)(D).
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transition services for matriculation planning;228 and the process for
review, revising, and amending the IEP.229
d. Procedural and disciplinary protections
The IDEA provides procedural safeguards to ensure that schools
do not deprive students with disabilities of a free appropriate public
education.230 The school systems must give parents an opportunity to
review all school records “with respect to the identification,
evaluation, and educational placement of the child and the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child.”231 They require
that parents receive “written prior notice,” in their native language,
whenever the school system proposes or refuses to initiate or change
“the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of free appropriate public education to the child.”232 The
IDEA also establishes procedures to protect children whose parents are
not known, or cannot be located.233 The state may appoint a surrogate
who is involved in the education or care of the child but does not work
for any of the educational agencies, state or local.234 Finally, the IDEA
requires that schools give parents a copy of these procedural safeguards
in their native language annually, or upon a referral or initial request for
evaluation, filing a complaint, or request by the parent.235
A child’s disability may inhibit the child’s ability to comply with school
behavior and conduct rules. For example, the disability may impair the
extent to which the child can exercise self-control, understand the rules,
or maintain focus and attention throughout the school day. For a
student facing these challenges to have an opportunity to flourish in an
educational environment, it is therefore crucial that they be protected
from adverse consequences that interfere with their education and
which stem from behavior that is an instantiation of their disability.236
Thus, the IDEA shields students by prohibiting the school from taking
disciplinary action against a student whose conduct is a manifestation of
228. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
229. § 1414(a)(2).
230. § 1415(a).
231. § 1415(b)(1).
232. § 1415(b)(3)–(4).
233. § 1415(b)(2)(A).
234. Id.
235. § 1415(d).
236. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–10 (1988) (explaining congressional
intent to provide procedural safeguards for emotionally disturbed and disabled
children who were unilaterally excluded from the educational process under
previous iterations of the IDEA and related legislation).
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his disability.237 School personnel may not move a child to another
setting or suspend a child for more than ten consecutive school days in
the same school year, even if for separate incidents of conduct, without
first conducting a hearing to determine if the behavior at issue is a
manifestation of the child’s disability.238 These hearings, known as
manifestation determination hearings, are also required if a child is
removed from the school through suspensions or being sent home for
more than ten school days during any one school year.239 Once the hearing
process is triggered, the IEP team, including the student’s parents, must
meet within ten school days to determine if the behavior was a
manifestation of the student’s disability or the result of the school agency’s
failure to implement the IEP.240 If the team determines that the violation
was a manifestation of the disability or failure to implement the IEP, the
student is entitled to return to the same school with a behavioral plan and
supplementary aids and services, unless the IEP team agrees that the child’s
placement should be changed.241 In Honig v. Doe,242 the Supreme Court
recognized that by creating this disciplinary procedural protection,
“Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students.”243
e.

The IDEA and private schools

The IDEA does not govern private schools. The IDEA does, however,
impose some obligations on public school districts with respect to
children with disabilities within the district attending private school.
These obligations may arise under one of three situations. First, a public
school may place a student with a disability in a private school as a way of
237. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E).
238. 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1) (2017).
239. § 300.530(b)(2). School officials may remove a student to an “interim
alternative education setting for not more than [forty-five] school days” regardless of
whether the behavior is a manifestation of the student’s disability under “special
circumstances,” including: (1) possession of a weapon at school, on school premises,
or at a local school function; (2) knowingly possessing, using, selling, or soliciting
illegal drugs or a controlled substance at school, on school premises, or at a school
function; or (3) inflicting serious bodily injury upon another person while at school,
on school premises, or at a school function.” Id. § 300.530(g).
240. § 300.530(e)(1).
241. § 300.530(e)–(f).
242. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
243. Id. at 323. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, referenced the Mills
decision, which held that the District of Columbia violated the Equal Protection
Clause by excluding 12,000 to 18,000 disabled students from public education
without due process due to exclusions, suspensions, and expulsions based on
disciplinary ground. Id. at 324.
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meeting its core obligation under the IDEA to provide the student with
a free appropriate public education.244 If the IEP team concludes that
placement in a private school is the most effective way to provide the
child free appropriate public education in the least restrictive
environment, it may place the student in the private school—and,
crucially, cover the cost of tuition at the private school.245 If the IEP
team places a student in a private school, “the student is entitled to
the same rights and services the student would receive if the student
was placed in a public school.”246
Second, parents may choose to place their child in a private school
because they believe the public schools are contravening their child’s
right to free appropriate public education.247 Under these circumstances,
a court may order the school district to reimburse the parents for
private school tuition after a due process hearing,248 if the parents
establish that the school agency did not make a free appropriate
public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to
enrollment in the private school.249
On the other hand, if a parent chooses to enroll a child in a private
school for reasons other than a dispute over free appropriate public
education, the IDEA offers little to no protection. Under the “child
find” mandate, the school district has an obligation to locate, identify,
and evaluate all children within its borders.250 This includes children
whose parents choose to place their children in private schools,
rather than in the public school system.251 After the school district
meets its “child find” obligation, however, its obligations towards
private school students with disabilities differs drastically from its
obligations to children with disabilities in the public school system.

244. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (2012).
245. Id. The IDEA describes this circumstance of private school placement as a
“means of carrying out the requirements” of the IDEA by the state. Id.
246. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 75–76.
247. See id. at 76 (discussing parental placement as opposed to agency placement
in a private school).
248. See discussion infra Section III.D.3.
249. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Further, a court may reduce or deny
reimbursement if: (1) the parents did not inform the IEP team, at the last meeting
or within ten days of enrollment, that they were rejecting the proposal to provide
FAPE, including their concerns and intent to enroll the child in a private school; (2)
the agency told parents it intended to evaluate the child and the parents did not make
the child available for evaluation; or (3) “upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness
with respect to actions taken by the parents.” Id. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(iii).
250. See discussion supra Section III.D.2.a.
251. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I).
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Although the district is required to provide a proportionate amount
of IDEA funds to support services for children with disabilities, it has
no individual obligation to children with disabilities enrolled in
private schools.252 That is, none of the comprehensive procedures,
obligations, and protections described in detail above, apply to
students enrolled in a private school. This includes students who are
enrolled in a private school through a voucher program.
If, after the initial evaluation process, the evaluators determine that
a child who is parentally enrolled in a private school has a disability
covered by the IDEA, that child does not have an individual right to
free appropriate public education.253 Moreover, parents who choose
to enroll their child in a private school do not have any of the IDEA’s
procedural protections or due process rights regarding the education
of their child with a disability.254 These parents cannot file a
complaint under any part of the IDEA other than the “child find”
process.255 In fact, most state departments of education have no
authority to evaluate or explore complaints of any kind against private
schools.256 The profound implications of the lack of protections
children with disabilities voluntarily enrolled in private schools is
explored in further detail in Part II.D.

252. 34 C.F.R. § 300.137 (2017).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 300.140.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Colorado Non-Public Schools, COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/nonpublic_index (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“A
non-public school is considered a private business. If you would like to file a
complaint against a non-public organization, please contact the Attorney General’s
Consumer Fraud Unit.”); Opening a Private School, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/private-schools/opening-a-privateschool.stml (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“Private Schools in Florida are not licensed,
approved, accredited, or regulated by the State Board of Education or the local
(school district) education agency.”); Nonpublic School Services: FAQ, N.J. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://www.state.nj.us/education/nonpublic/faq.htm#Parent_Complaints_and_
NJDOE_Regulatory_Authority (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“The NJDOE regulates
the provision of state and federally funded programs to students in nonpublic
schools. The NJDOE does not have the authority to intervene in matters of internal
policy or parental disputes that are unrelated to the provision of these programs.”);
Private Schools Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/ps/
psfaq.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“Private schools function outside the
jurisdiction of the California Department of Education (CDE) and most state
education regulations. Private schools do not participate in California’s educational
accountability system and are directly accountable to students and their parents or
guardians, based on the terms of the private school enrollment period.”).
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3.

The IDEA’s dispute resolution processes
Disputes and conflicts may arise among members of the IEP team.
Not surprisingly, such disagreements arise most commonly between
the school district representatives and the child’s parents. Conflicts
may arise, for example, during the IEP evaluation or re-evaluation
process, over differences about whether a student is eligible for
services, the appropriate level of services, or the appropriate
placement for the child may come to fruition or during manifest
determination hearings.
To resolve these disputes and conflicts, the IDEA outlines three
formal processes: a state education complaint process, mediation or
a due process hearing.257 Congress added the mediation procedures,
which includes a mandatory dispute resolution session prior to a due
process hearing, in the most recent iteration of the IDEA.258 Mediation
procedures were added to encourage alternative dispute resolution
outside of the costly formal hearing processes.259 Generally, the
primary purpose of the three dispute resolution processes is to remedy
deficiencies in an IEP or services.260 Typically, the remedies sought
are compensatory services designed to compensate the child for
services due under the IDEA that were not provided in violation of
the law.261 For example, if a child’s IEP requires the school to provide
two hours of speech therapy a week and those services were not
provided for the first half of the school year, the school may need to
provide four hours of speech therapy a week for the second half of
the year—the two hours required by the IEP and two hours of
compensatory time. In limited circumstances, monetary compensation
may also be awarded.262 For example, if the parents in the above
scenario paid for private speech therapy when the school failed to
meet its obligation under the IEP, a school district would be required
to reimburse the parents for these costs in lieu of compensatory
services.263 A school district may also be required to take additional future
actions to meets its obligation to provide a free appropriate public

257. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (2012) (complaint process); § 1415(e) (mediation);
§ 1415(f) (impartial due process hearing).
258. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 48.
259. See id. at 50, 61.
260. See id. at 47 (“The procedural safeguards notice provides parents with the information
they need if they disagree with actions of the school district or decisions of the IEP team.”).
261. See discussion infra Section III.D.3.
262. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b) (providing that remedies for denial of appropriate
services may include compensatory services or monetary reimbursement).
263. Id.
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education for a particular student.264 If a dispute is not resolved by either
the state agency complaint process or mediation, and instead a due
process hearing takes place, the hearing officer may impose additional
remedies, such as those discussed below.
Under the IDEA, the first stage of the formal dispute resolution
process is the state education agency complaint process.265 The IDEA
requires that all state education agencies make available internal
processes to receive and resolve complaints about IDEA violations.266 A
complaint may be filed by any individual or organization within one
year of the alleged violation and must include: (1) a statement that the
public agency violated the IDEA; (2) facts that support the allegation;
and (3) the complainant’s signature and contact information.267 If the
complaint is about the school’s treatment of a specific child, it must
also include the name and residence of the child, the school the child
attends, and a proposed resolution to the problem alleged in the
complaint.268 As a part of the mandate to resolve complaints, the
state education agency may investigate the facts and circumstances
underlying the complaint.269 If the state education agency determines
that a child was denied appropriate services in violation of the IDEA,
the agency may require a school to take corrective action, such as
compensatory services or monetary reimbursement, and/or require
appropriate future services for the child.270 The state complaint
process provides parents with an option for resolution outside a
formal hearing process. This option is most effective when the violation
is objectively clear on the facts of the complaint.271 When there are
disagreements over the appropriateness of certain services or placement
options, a formal due process hearing is a more effective forum for
resolving the dispute, since this procedure has a due process hearing
officer who can evaluate all the facts and circumstances.272

264. Id. § 300.151(b)(2) (requiring resolution of state complaint procedures to
include both retrospective and prospective remedies as best practices for ensuring a
free appropriate public education).
265. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2012).
266. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151.
267. § 303.153.
268. § 303.153(b)(4).
269. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 58 (describing the differences between a
state education agency complaint and a due process hearing complaint).
270. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b).
271. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 59 (providing scenarios with clear facts in
which the state complaint process would be most useful).
272. See id.
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Second, under the IDEA, every state and local education agency
must establish procedures to allow parties to resolve any disputes
through a mediation process.273 The mediation process must be:
(1) voluntary on the part of both parties; (2) not used to deny or
delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing or other rights; and
(3) is conducted by a qualified, impartial, trained mediator.274 The
state must bear the cost of the mediation process and is responsible
for maintaining a list of mediators knowledgeable in the special
education laws and regulations.275 All mediation discussions are
confidential and may not be used as evidence by either party in any
subsequent due process or civil proceeding.276 If the parties reach an
agreement through the mediation process, the parties then execute a
legally binding agreement that sets forth the resolution.277 Mediation
can be an excellent option for parents to resolve disputes under the
IDEA because they can often navigate the mediation process without
an attorney, they do not waive any rights to further proceedings, and
the state bears the costs.278
Finally, if a dispute is not resolved by either the state complaint
process or mediation, a parent also has a right to an impartial due
process hearing to resolve disputes or complaints alleging a violation
of the IDEA. A parent initiates the due process hearing procedures
by providing the school with a due process complaint notice.279
Furthermore, a parent must file this notice within two years of the
date the parent or agency has actual or constructive knowledge about
the alleged action that gives rise to the complaint.280 The complaint
notice must include: (1) the name, address, and school of the child
who suffered the alleged violation; (2) “a description of the nature of
such problem . . . including facts relating to the problem”; and (3) “a
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and

273. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2012).
274. § 1415(e)(2)(A).
275. § 1415(e)(2)(C)–(D).f
276. § 1415(e)(2)(G).
277. § 1415(e)(2)(F). The legally binding agreement must (1) state that all
discussions that occurred during the mediation process are confidential and may not be
used in subsequent hearings; (2) be signed by both the parent and a representative of the
school district; and (3) be enforceable in any State or Federal court. Id.
278. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 51 (outlining the mechanics of the mediation
process when resolving disputes under the IDEA).
279. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
280. § 1415(f)(3)(C).
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available to the party at the time.”281 The substance of this initial
complaint is critical because a party is not allowed to raise any issues
at a due process hearing that were not raised in the due process
complaint notice.282 The purpose of the complaint notice is to give
the school district or the state education agency an opportunity to
resolve the problem before a due process hearing convenes.283
Once a parent sends a due process complaint notice, the school
district can respond by either responding to the specific issues
outlined in the complaint or challenging its sufficiency.284 If the
school district decides to respond to the substantive issues in the
complaint, it must send the response within ten days of receiving the
notice.285 On the other hand, if the school district alleges the
complaint is legally insufficient, it has fifteen days from receiving the
complaint to respond.286 A hearing officer must make a determination
about the legal sufficiency of the complaint within five days of receiving a
response from the school district.287 If a parent is concerned about the
sufficiency of, or substantive issues contained in, the complaint, they may
amend it if either the school district consents to resolve the issues through a
resolution meeting; or the hearing officer grants permission to amend the
complaint no later than five days before the due process hearing.288
Both sides have significant procedural rights and protections
during an impartial due process hearing.
These rights and
protections consist of the following: (1) the right to be accompanied
and advised by counsel and by individuals with specialized knowledge
and training regarding children with disabilities; (2) the right to
present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel attendance
of witnesses; (3) the right to a written, or, at the option of the
parents, electronic verbatim record of the hearing; (4) the right to
written, or at the option of the parents, electronic findings of fact and

281. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii). State educational agencies are mandated to develop a
model form to assist parents in filing these complaints in accordance with the
statutory requirements. § 1415(b)(8).
282. § 1415(f)(3)(B).
283. See CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 48 (explaining that the due process
complaint notice is a mandatory prerequisite to having a due process hearing under
the IDEA, whereas it was optional under prior versions).
284. See id. at 49 (noting that the school district must respond to the substantive issues
of the complaint and may exercise the option to challenge its sufficiency at its discretion).
285. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(ii).
286. § 1415(c)(2)(A), (C).
287. § 1415(c)(2)(D).
288. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i).
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decisions.289 The IDEA is silent on burden of proof, but the Supreme
Court has held that the party challenging the IEP bears the burden of
proof,290 although some states have statutorily imposed the burden on
the school district.291
A hearing officer, who meets several
qualifications under the IDEA,292 must generally render a final
determination of whether the child’s right to free appropriate public
education was violated, within forty-five calendar days.293
After the due process hearing concludes, either party can file an
administrative appeal or a civil action in state or federal court under
procedures outlined in the IDEA.294 States can opt for either a one tier
hearing system, where the state education agency conducts the
hearing, or a two tier system with an initial review by a local authority
that can be appealed to the state education agency.295 After exhausting
the administrative process, either side can contest the hearing officer’s
final decision in state or federal district court within ninety days of the
final decision, or within the time frame explicitly provided by the state.296
Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the IDEA dispute
resolution process is the requirement that a school district must continue to
adhere to the IEP in place for the student at the time the complaint is filed
throughout the entire hearing and appeals process.297 Known as the “stayput” rule, this provides very strong protections for parents who are
disputing a proposal to change an IEP to the student’s detriment.298 For
example, if a school district plans to move a child from an integrated
289. § 1415(h).
290. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–58 (2005) (relying on traditional
notions of the burden of proof and examining congressional intent).
291. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 54–55 (clarifying that while the burden of proof
is typically on the parent, as the likely complaining party, there is no prohibition on
state legislation that shifts the burden).
292. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3). The hearing officer must: (1) not be an employee of
the state or local education agency involved in the education or care of the child; (2)
not have a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person’s objectivity
in the hearing; (3) possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the
provisions of the IDEA, federal and state regulations pertaining to the IDEA; and
legal interpretations of the IDEA by federal and state courts; (4) possess the
knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate, standard
legal practice, and (5) possess the knowledge and ability to render and write
decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice. Id.
293. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)(1) (2017).
294. § 1415(g), (i).
295. § 1415(g); see also CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 56 (discussing the different
ways states manage the appeal process under the IDEA).
296. § 1415(i)(2).
297. § 1415(j).
298. CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 57–58.
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classroom to a segregated placement, the student may not be moved until
the due process hearing and all avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
However, the “stay-put” rule does not always benefit parents and students,
since it merely entrenches the status quo for the duration of the dispute
resolution and appeals processes. If the parent is dissatisfied with the
current IEP and therefore requests a change to the IEP, which the school
district rejects, the “stay-put” rule means that the IEP remains in place and
unchanged throughout the legal processes. This may cause significant
frustration, as the parent may wait years for a legal resolution. The parent
is, however, free at any time to move the child to a different school district
or try to find a private placement through the dispute process.299
Through this impartial due process hearing, parents may be entitled
to additional remedies beyond an order for services or a particular
placement. Victorious parents may also be awarded attorney’s fees at
the hearing level or on appeal, although they are not entitled to
recover expenses related to expert witnesses.300 A court may reduce fee
awards for a variety of reasons, including: (1) if the parent unreasonably
protracted the case; (2) if the fees unreasonably exceeded prevailing
community rates; or (3) if the parents rejected a settlement offer
substantially similar to the hearing outcome.301
4.

Key differences between the IDEA, section 504, and the ADA
Two other federal laws—section 504302 and the ADA303—touch on
the rights of children with disabilities in a variety of settings. The
degree to which a federally funded voucher program may trigger new
obligations for private schools under either section 504 or the ADA has
not fully been explored. However, neither of these laws is perfectly
coextensive with the IDEA. To the contrary, both of these laws—even
if they were to apply to private schools as part of a federal voucher
program—offer fewer rights and protections than the IDEA provides
to students with disabilities.304 These include key differences in what
299. Id.
300. § 1415(i)(3)(B); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291, 298–304 (2006) (suggesting that the legislative history does not permit expert
fees to be recovered). Furthermore, attorney’s fees are generally not awarded for
time an attorney spends in IEP meetings, unless the meeting is convened as a result
of the administrative proceeding or judicial action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
301. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(c)(2)(i)(C).
302. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
304. A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and Section 504, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF.
FUND, https://dredf.org/legal-advocacy/laws/a-comparison-of-ada-idea-and-section504 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND].

2018]

THE FALLACY OF CHOICE

1841

disabilities are covered, the educational requirements imposed, and
the self-limiting provisions included in both section 504 and the ADA.305
Section 504 and the ADA are, at their core civil rights laws, designed
to protect individuals with disabilities beyond the context of education,
thus they contain a broader definition of an individual with a disability
than the IDEA.306 Under both section 504 and the ADA, an
individual with a disability is an individual with a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of that individual.307 The non-exhaustive definition of “major life
activities” includes a spectrum of activities from caring for oneself, seeing,
walking, learning, concentrating, thinking, and communicating.308
Consequently, under section 504 and the ADA, a child with a disability
does not have to benefit from “special education and related services” to
be protected by these statutes.309 All children eligible for the IDEA
protections are covered by both section 504 and the ADA, but a child with
a disability under section 504 and ADA may not qualify for IDEA
protections.310
Section 504 has some coextensive provisions to the IDEA, but these
provisions have less force than those in the IDEA because the
purpose of section 504 is equal access, rather than ensuring
meaningful educational opportunities for children with disabilities.
As a civil rights law, section 504 “is designed to level the playing field for
individuals with disabilities” by removing barriers to their ability to

305. Pat Howey, Key Differences Between Section 504 and IDEA, WRIGHTSLAW,
http://www.wrightslaw.com/howey/504.idea (last modified March 22, 2012).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4); Compare Supreme Court Decisions’ Narrow Definition of
“Disability,” FINDLAW, https://civilrights.findlaw.com/discrimination/supreme-courtdecisions-narrow-definition-of-disability (last visited Aug 17, 2018) (analyzing how
judicial decisions have narrowed the definition of disability), with Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADA AA), WRIGHSTLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.
com/info/sec504.adaaa.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing the purpose of
the ADAA AA and how it restored the act to its original inclusive coverage).
307. 29 U.S.C. § 705(9); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). This definition also includes impairments of “major
bodily functions” including “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.” Id.
309. For example, a child with a vision impairment has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the child’s life activities. However, with glasses the
child likely does not special education or related services. This child would be
covered by section 504 and the ADA, but not the IDEA.
310. What is the difference between Section 540 and IDEA?, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON
ADHD, http://209.126.179.230/faq.cfm?fid=10&varLang=en (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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access a public education.311 Although this law uses similar language
(e.g., free appropriate public education, accommodations, assistive
technology), the protections are not nearly as robust as those of the
IDEA.312 Section 504 lacks an IEP requirement with specially designed
instruction to help the student access educational content, and also
lacks therapeutic support time to help a child reach individualized
goals. Both of these shortcomings make section 504 ill-suited to
provide meaningful educational opportunities to children with
significant disabilities. Consequently, this law will not protect the
most vulnerable children with disabilities, namely those who need the
most rigorous support and intervention. For many children with
disabilities, merely removing barriers is not enough; these children
need proactive supporting measures specifically tailored to their
unique individual needs. The IDEA provides for such measures
whereas section 504 falls short.
In contrast to section 504, the ADA does not apply only to entities
that receive federal funding. Rather, the ADA applies to all public
schools and non-religious private schools through Title II and Title
III of the ADA.313 Title II prohibits state and local governments from
discriminating in all services, programs, and activities—this includes
public schools.314 Title III prohibits public accommodations—that is,
businesses that are open to the general public—from discrimination
but exempts religious entities.315 Consequently, Title III governs secular
private schools, but not parochial or religious private schools.
While the ADA prohibits discrimination generally, it does not require
that schools provide an appropriate education to children with disabilities.
To be sure, the ADA does require public entities, including school
districts, to provide auxiliary aids and services to “ensure effective
communication” such that individuals with disabilities have “an equal
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service,
program, or activity.”316 However, these auxiliary aids and services pale
in comparison to those identified by the IDEA.317 This is not altogether
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. DEP’T OF JUST., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II REGULATIONS:
NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICES 2 (2010).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2012) (defining public entity).
315. § 12181 (defining commerce as applied by the statute).
316. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b) (2017).
317. A Comparison of IDEA, ADA, and Section 504, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CTR.,
http://www.adainfo.org/sites/default/files/A%20COMPARISON%20of%20ADAIDEA-504.pdf.
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surprising, since the purpose of the ADA is merely to allow equal access
to the entity—in this case, to the school—rather than to ensure a free
appropriate public education.318
Section 504 and the ADA provide inadequate protection for the
right to education for children with disabilities. Both laws fail to
include provisions for special education and related services tailored
to meet the individual student’s needs.319 Neither law provides a
mechanism for delivering education for eligible students, such as the
IEP, nor does the federal government provide education funding to
schools to ensure state compliance with the law.320 And of course,
since neither law mandates a detailed IEP, neither law contains the
kinds of rigorous mediation and due process procedures for
challenging the adequacy of education provided, which are mandated
under the IDEA. Most fundamentally, these laws are only designed to
protect the right to access, not the right to educational benefits.321
For example, if a child is confined to a wheelchair because of a
disability, section 504 and the ADA protect that child from
discrimination and even demand a public or non-religious private
school to ensure physical access, such as by widening school doors
and hallways.322 However, if that same child has neurological deficits
impacting the child’s ability to learn, neither the ADA nor section
504 demand the child receive an educational benefit while physically
accessing the school.323 Only the IDEA entitles a child to “specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique
needs”324 of the child to “enable a child to make [educational]
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”325 This is,

318. DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, supra note 304.
319. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 701 (providing no individualized support and thus
creating a large gap in educational opportunities); 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
320. At a Glance: Which Laws Do What, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/
school-learning/your-childs-rights/basics-about-childs-rights/at-a-glance-which-lawsdo-what (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (highlighting the absence of any mechanism to
ensure the targeted students receive the intended result).
321. Peter Wright & Pamela Wright, Key Differences Between Section 504, the ADA, and
the IDEA, WRIGHTSLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/sec504.summ.rights (last
revised Jan. 31, 2017).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012).
325. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (noting
that each child’s educational needs are unique and will require some level of tailoring).
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of course, because only the IDEA was enacted to specifically address
the educational needs of children with disabilities.326
C. Supreme Court Decisions in Special Education
The Supreme Court first grappled with the initial version of the IDEA
and its free appropriate public education mandate327 in Board of
Education v. Roweley.328 After a lengthy statutory interpretation analysis,
Justice Rehnquist determined the that the IDEA required the state to
comply with the procedures set forth in the IDEA and, substantively,
to provide an educational program that is “reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits[.]”329 Justice Rehnquist
specifically noted that the IDEA did not require “that States maximize
the potential of [children with disabilities],”330 but rather they must
merely develop an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade” regardless
of the child’s potential.331 In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall, Justice White rebuked the majority for narrowly
interpreting “free appropriate public education” as requiring merely
“some benefit” rather than the “full educational opportunity to all
[children with disabilities]” announced in the purpose of the IDEA.332
While the Supreme Court has issued a handful of other decisions
regarding the IDEA,333 it did not further clarify the substantive
326. Id.
327. Although Federal District Courts evaluated the obligations of the State to
provide a public education to children with disabilities under the U.S. Constitution
in PARC and Mills, the Supreme Court has only addressed the issue in the context of
the IDEA. See Louie Li, PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of
Education, DC, ROOTED IN RIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.rootedinrights.org
/15321-revision-v1 (discussing the impact of PARC and Mills on a child’s right to education).
328. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187–91 (1982). The case was brought
by parents of a “child with only minimal residual hearing” after school administrators
denied the parents’ request for a qualified sign-language interpreter for all her
academic classes. Id. at 176. The lower courts held that “although the child
performed better than the average child in her class and was advancing easily from
grade to grade, she was not performing as well academically as she would without her
[disability].” Id.
329. Id. at 207.
330. Id. at 189.
331. Id. at 204.
332. Id. at 212–14.
333. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) (holding that
“[p]arents enjoy rights under the IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to
prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf”); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006) (determining that the prevailing parents may
not recover non-attorney expert or consultant fees); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
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requirement of free appropriate public education until thirty-five
years later.334 In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1,335 a
unanimous Supreme Court infused the IDEA with renewed vitality.336
The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation that an “IEP is
adequate as long as it is calculated to confer an ‘educational benefit
[that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.’”337 Instead, the Supreme
Court declared that “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under the
IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”338
In his reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts relied on the purpose of the
IDEA and its origins as a Congressional response to the prior
exclusion of children with disabilities from educational opportunities.339
Chief Justice Roberts argued that “[a] substantive standard not
focused on student progress would do little to remedy the pervasive
and tragic academic stagnation that prompted Congress to act.”340

56 (2005) (holding that a student challenging a school under the IDEA in an
administrative hearing bears the burden of proof as the party seeking relief); Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999) (finding that continuous
nursing service for a quadriplegic student qualifies as “related services” to access
public education under IDEA); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 7
(1993) (concluding that “[a] court may order reimbursement for parents who
unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate
education under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an
education that is otherwise proper under IDEA,” but does comply with all of the
Act’s procedures); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323–26 (1988) (interpreting the “stayput” provision to prohibit state or local school authorities from unilaterally excluding
disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing
out of their disabilities during the pendency of review proceedings); Sch. Comm. v.
Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–72 (1985) (holding that a reviewing court has the
authority to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on
a private special education if the court determines such placement, rather than
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act even if the parent changed the placement
during proceedings); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 885, 895 (1984)
(holding “clean intermittent catheterization” is a “related service” under the Act
when medically necessary for a student to access FAPE).
334. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).
335. 137 S. Ct. 988.
336. Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Court’s Decision Rejecting Low Bar for Students with
Disabilities, Under the Spotlight, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2017 11:26 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-courts-decision-rejecting-lowbar-students-disabilities-spotlight.
337. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)).
338. Id. at 999 (emphasis added).
339. Id.
340. Id.
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He concluded that a student offered an educational program under
the Tenth Circuit’s “merely more than de minimis” standard “can
hardly be said to have been offered an education at all.”341 While the
Supreme Court did not fully adopt the standard proposed by the
petitioners,342 advocates for children with disabilities celebrated the
decision for rejecting “the ‘bigotry of low expectations’ that marked prior
interpretations of Rowley.”343
D. The Limited Protections for Children with Disabilities
in Private Schools
Children with disabilities whose parents voluntarily choose to
enroll them in a private school through a voucher program have few
protections under federal disability law. Federal laws apply differently
to children with disabilities when their parents voluntarily choose to
enroll them in a private school, rather than when a public school
places children with disabilities in a private school through the two
processes codified in the IDEA.344 First, the public school system is
341. Id. at 1000–01.
342. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988, 997 (2017) (No. 15-827) (declining the family’s invitation to establish a more stringent
standard that would require public schools to give children with disabilities an opportunity
to (among other things) “achieve academic success” and “attain self-sufficiency”).
343. Endrew Decision Creates Important New Opportunities for Students with Disabilities,
BAZELON CENT., https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/resmgr/docs/
accessible_2017/Endrew_paper_LH__9-8-17-1.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018)
(quoting Brief of Former Officials of the U.S. Department of Education as Amici
Curiae at 6, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (“[W]e should reject the soft bigotry of
low expectations and expect all children, including children with disabilities, to
achieve academic success . . . .”)).
344. Under the IDEA, a public school may place a child with a disability in a
private program “as the means of carrying out the requirements of” the IDEA. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (2012). The public school may do this because the tuition
at the private program is cheaper than the facilities and staffing changes the public
school would have to undertake to provide a FAPE for that particular child. This
placement decision is made through the IEP team process and the IDEA still applies
to these students while they are in private placement. A parent may also enroll their
child in a private program without the consent of the public school system when they
believe the public school system has not met their FAPE obligation. In these
circumstances, the parents may seek tuition reimbursement through an IDEA due
process hearing. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C). In the due process hearing the parent must
establish the program offered by the public school system “had not made a free
appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that
enrollment.” Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). If the parent is victorious at the hearing, the
district would have to substantively modify its program to provide that particular
child FAPE or agree to continue the child’s enrollment at the private school under
the private school placement by public agencies provision of the IDEA.
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released of most of its substantive obligations to a child with a
disability when the parent chooses to enroll that child in the private
school system.345 Second, as described above, private schools—especially
religious private schools—have very few obligations to children with
disabilities under federal law.346 Third, there are limited educational and
procedural protections for children with disabilities and their parents
once they enroll in private school.347 Finally, parents of children with
disabilities enrolled in private schools have fewer remedies.348
Under federal law, the public school system has minimal obligations
to children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private
schools. The public school system is only required to evaluate private
school children with disabilities within their boundaries and spend
federal IDEA funds “to provide equitable services” to these children
as a group.349 These students have no individual right to free
appropriate public education.350 Therefore, they “do not have an
individual entitlement to services they would receive if they were
enrolled in . . . a public schools.”351 Under the equitable funding
requirement, “it is possible that some “parentally placed children with
disabilities will not receive any services while others will.”352 If a child with
a disability does receive services from the public school system while
enrolled in a private school, those services are governed by a “services
plan” that provides services based on the school district’s allocation of
funds for private school students, and not on that child’s individual
needs.353 This is a stark contrast to the IDEA’s expansive protections.
Moreover, parents who place their children in private schools do
not have the due process hearing rights to contest the school

345. See 34 C.F.R. 300.137 (2017) (reducing the protections when the child is
parentally placed).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
347. 34 C.F.R. § 300.140.
348. Sandhya Gopal, Compensatory Education and the IDEA, U.N.C. SCH. L. BULL.
15–19 (2004), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/slb/slbspr04/article2.pdf.
349. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:
PROVISIONS RELATED TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES ENROLLED BY THEIR PARENTS IN
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1 (2011).
350. Id. (“Parentally placed children with disabilities do not have an individualized
entitlement to services they would receive if they were enrolled in a public school.”).
351. Id.
352. Id. (emphasis added).
353. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.138(b) (2017); see also CHAPMAN, supra note 149, at 78–79
(“The services are provided based upon the school district’s allocation of funds for
private school children and the plan the district has developed, in consultation with
private school representative, to service private school children.”).
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district’s services or compliance with a services plan.354 They can only
use the IDEA’s due process procedures to contest a district’s failure
to meet its obligation under “child find” to identify, locate, and
evaluate all children with disabilities within its boundaries.355
The minimal obligations of the public school system to serve
children with disabilities placed by their parents in private schools is
further compounded by the few, if any, duties that private schools
owe to these children under federal law. As described above, the only
federal laws that may apply to private schools are the ADA and
section 504, which have limited scope because they are designed to
ensure equal access, not confer a right to education.356 Additionally,
as discussed above, religious private schools are exempt from the
ADA.357 This is a significant, perhaps even overwhelming caveat, since
religious schools comprise the vast majority of private elementary and
secondary schools across America.358 Thus, only section 504 creates any
substantive obligations for “all entities including private sectarian as well as
non-sectarian schools that receive, directly or indirectly, federal funds.”359
A federally funded voucher program would likely trigger section
504 obligations for private schools that choose to participate in the
program. However, under section 504, private schools have negligible
requirements to serve children with disabilities. Section 504 imposes
requirements to serve children with disabilities under a broader
definition of “individual with a disability” than the IDEA definition of
a “child with a disability.”360 In contrast to the public schools under
the IDEA, private schools have only three obligations to children with
disabilities under section 504: (1) educate the child in the least
restrictive environment;361 (2) provide the child an equal opportunity

354. 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(a).
355. § 300.140(b); id. § 300.131.
356. See supra Section II.B.4.
357. See id. (discussing the exemptions and providing an overview of the religious
exceptions).
358. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES:
RESULTS FROM THE 2015–16 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2017) (finding that sixtyseven percent of private schools had a religious orientation or purpose).
359. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) as Applied to Private Schools, FINDLAW,
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-rehabilitation-act-of-1973section-504-as-applied-to (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act].
360. See supra Section II.B.4.
361. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c) (2017) (subjecting recipients to the least restrictive
environment mandate codified in 34 C.F.R. § 104.34).
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to participate in extracurricular activities;362 and (3) provide “minor
adjustments” to accommodate students with disabilities.363
Private education institutions that receive federal funds are
prohibited from excluding a qualified student their disability can be
accommodated with only “minor adjustments.”364 There is relatively
little case law on what constitutes a “minor adjustment,” likely
because of the lack of procedural remedies for children with
disabilities enrolled in private schools. However, the case law that
does exist seems to establish a standard that is highly deferential to
the private school program.365 Thus, under this minimal standard,
private schools receiving federal funds can easily exclude children
with disabilities because they would not be able to meet the
program’s requirements in spite of their disability without more than
mere “minor adjustments.”366 The children who benefit most from
the IDEA can simply be excluded under section 504 from “school
choice” programs. Needless to say, such exclusion is the antithesis of
choice for parents of disabled children with significant needs.
Moreover, even if the private school does enroll a child with a disability
and makes accommodations for them, the school is allowed to charge
higher tuition for that student than for students without a disability.
Under section 504, a private school may charge more for the “provision of
an appropriate education to [persons with disabilities] than to [persons
without disabilities] . . . to the extent that any additional charge is justified
by a substantial increase in cost to the recipient.”367 As a result, the school
may profit from making accommodations for the child with a disability.368
More importantly, permitting private schools to charge a premium for
students with disabilities—on top of the often already hefty tuition
charged—runs completely counter to the IDEA’s key mandate of a free
appropriate public education.
362. Id. (subjecting recipients to the extracurricular activities mandate codified in
34 C.F.R. § 104.37).
363. Id.; Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359.
364. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (emphasis added).
365. See Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359. In Hunt v. St. Peter School, a federal
district court focused its inquiry on the student, determining that a child with severe
asthma was not an “otherwise qualified” individual with a disability protected by
section 504 because the accommodation she required far exceeded the “minor
adjustment” mandate. 963 F. Supp. 843, 850–51 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
366. See id. at 850–53 (discussing the distinction between minor adjustments and
the burden this particular case would place upon the administration).
367. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2017).
368. There was no case law on this provision of the regulations to clarify or outline any
limits on a private school for seeking additional costs to educate a child with a disability.
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If private schools voluntarily choose to provide special education to
a child with a disability, they have increased obligations under section
504.369 If the school provides special education it must comply with
the evaluation procedures and procedural safeguards of section
504.370 The evaluation provision merely requires a school to evaluate
a student prior to placing the student in special education services,371
in contrast to the robust evaluation guidelines in the IDEA that
require a school district to use a comprehensive assessment strategy
to determine if a child has a disability and, if so, the content of the
student’s individualized education program.372 Section 504 requires
recipient schools to establish and implement procedural safeguards
“with respect to actions regarding the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement” of a child with a disability.373 These must
include (1) notice; (2) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the
person to examine relevant records; (3) an impartial hearing; and (4) a
review procedure.374 These extra requirements are vague and slight in
comparison to the robust procedural protections codified in the IDEA,375
but more importantly, these provisions only apply if the private school
voluntarily provides special education.376 That is, even when a private
school admits a child with a disability, the procedural protections do not
apply if the school simply does not provide the student with special
education. The provisions therefore disincentivize private schools from
providing special education services to children with disabilities.377

369. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c).
370. Id. (subjecting recipients that provide special education services to evaluation
and placement provisions in § 104.35 and procedural safeguards provision in § 104.36).
371. Id. § 104.35.
372. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2012).
373. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36.
374. Id.
375. See supra Section II.B.3.
376. 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(c); see The Rehabilitation Act, supra note 359 (noting the
various avenues through which schools can receive federal funding).
377. For example, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend in Indiana,
issued a guidance document to its schools advising all employees not to write or sign
any documents “agreeing to any specific accommodations” because it “may create a
contractual duty.” DIOCESE FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND CATH. SCHS., SECTION 504 AND
ACCOMMODATIONS (2011), http://www.marianhs.org (last visited Aug. 17, 2018)
(search in search bar for “special education”; then follow “Section 504 and
Accommodations” hyperlink under results). Furthermore, the guidance instructs the
school to create an “Individualized Catholic Education Plan” because “it does not
grant legal rights to the student, parent, or guardian . . . .” Id. This document
demonstrates the careful steps private schools take under federal law to avoid
substantive obligations to children with disabilities.
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Moreover, because the IDEA does not apply, children with
disabilities educated in private schools lack key protections that would
ensure the school keeps track of the children’s individual progress.378
Private schools are not required to provide “specialized instruction”
developed and monitored through an IEP to ensure a child is making
meaningful progress from year to year.379 Private schools are not
bound to employ “highly qualified teachers” under the IDEA, which
“requires teachers to have at least a bachelor’s degree and either full
certification as a special educator or successful completion of a state’s
special education licensing exam.”380 Further, private schools are not
required to be accountable for the academic achievement of children
with disabilities because there is no oversight by state departments of
education or the federal government.381 Finally, a student with a
disability does not have the same disciplinary protections under the
IDEA, so they may be expelled for behaviors that are a manifestation
of their disability.382
Finally, children with disabilities in private schools lack the
significant legal remedies codified in the IDEA to protect the
educational rights of this vulnerable population. The NCD cites the
requirement that children and their families waive IDEA rights—
including the right of parents to participate in meetings about
whether the school is meeting their child’s education needs—as its
chief concern about special education voucher programs.383 Unlike
public schools under the IDEA, private schools “are not obligated to
provide a meaningful education and cannot legally be held accountable
when a student makes no academic progress.”384 As a result, children
with disabilities enrolled in private schools by their parents likely will
suffer the same plight as the undereducated millions of children with
disabilities that prompted Congress to pass the IDEA in the first place.385

378. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017); see supra
Section II.B.4.
379. Hensel, supra note 5, at 322–23.
380. Id. at 325–26. “The complete absence of quality control over teaching,
however, runs counter to wealth of evidence reflecting the significance of education,
training, and professional development on teaching effectiveness.” Id. at 326.
381. Id. at 327–30.
382. See supra Section II.D.
383. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 88, at 60.
384. Hensel, supra note 5, at 331.
385. See id. (“In the absence of discernable benchmarks of progress and clearly
identified legal rights, there is a heightened chance that these children will face
intentional discrimination or seemingly benign indifference.”). Id.
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III. INDIANA—A VOUCHER PROGRAM CASE STUDY
Enacted by the General Assembly in 2011, Indiana’s Choice Scholarship
Program is now the largest and fastest growing voucher program in the
nation.386 The Indiana program provides an opportunity to evaluate the
consequences of a voucher program that the Trump administration
strongly favors and endorses.387
A. The Indiana Choice Scholarship Program Policies
The Choice Scholarship Program grants eligible students
scholarships (i.e., vouchers) that they can use at participating private
schools.388 A student must be a resident of Indiana, be between the
ages of five and twenty-two, and be accepted for enrollment by a
participating nonpublic “Choice School.”389 If a student meets these
initial eligibility thresholds, there are eight different pathways with
additional criteria for eligibility: (1) Continuing Choice Scholarship
Student Pathway;390 (2) Previous Choice Scholarship Student Pathway391;

386. Lee, supra note 18 (“In 2015–2016, the latest statistics available for Indiana,
there were 32,695 students participating in [Indiana’s] program, [which] makes this
program the single largest education voucher program in any state.”). The
program’s success can be attributed to the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination
that the program did not violate the Blaine provision in the Indiana Constitution, in
a dramatically different application of the provision from the nationwide trend of
state high courts. See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1227 (Ind. 2013) (holding
that “the test for examining whether a government expenditure violates Article 1,
Section 6, is not whether a religious or theological institution substantially benefits
from the expenditure, but whether the expenditure directly benefits such an
institution”) (emphasis removed); supra Section II.B.
387. DeVos lobbied for the Indiana Voucher Program and Mike Pence “led the
charge as the state’s governor to loosen eligibility requirements and greatly expand
the program’s reach.” Emma Brown & Mandy McLaren, How Indiana’s School Voucher
Program Soared, and What It Says about Education in the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Dec.
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/how-indianas-schoolvoucher-program-soared-and-what-it-says-about-education-in-the-trumpera/2016/12/26/13d1d3ec-bc97-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story; see also Mandy
McLaren, For Indiana Special Education Students, Choice Comes at a Cost, WASH. POST
(Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/for-indiana-specialeducation-students-choice-comes-at-a-cost/2016/12/26/3b875480-c3bc-11e6-9a51cd56ea1c2bb7.
388. IND. CODE §§ 20-51-1-4.3, 20-51-1-4.7, 20-51-1-5–8 (2017); Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1219.
389. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS FOR PARENTS AND STUDENTS, https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/
choice/1-choice-parent-faq-february-2018.pdf (lasted visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter
CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS]. A Choice School is a public or nonpublic school
participating in the program that meets certain criteria. IND. CODE § 20-51-1-6.
390. See CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389. Eligibility Requirements:
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(3) Previous Scholarship Granting Organization Award Pathway;392 (4)
Special Education Pathway;393 (5) “F” Public School Pathway;394 (6) Two
i. The student received a Choice Scholarship in the school year that
immediately precedes the school year for which the student is applying for a
Choice Scholarship, and ii. The student is required to have remained
enrolled at the Choice [S]chool for the entirety of the immediately
preceding school year, and iii. The student is a member of a household with
an annual income equal to or below 200% of the amount to qualify for the
federal free or reduced lunch program.
Id.
391. Eligibility Requirements:
Either: i. The student received a Choice Scholarship in a previous school
year that does not immediately precede the school year for which the student
is applying for Choice Scholarship; OR ii. The student received a Choice
Scholarship in the immediately preceding school year but the student exited
the Choice [S]chool prior to the end of the school year; AND: iii. The
student is a member of a household with an annual income equal to or
below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch
program.
Id.
392. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The student received a Scholarship Granting Organizations (SGO)
Scholarship in a previous school year, including a school year that does not
immediately precede the school year for which the student is applying for a
Choice Scholarship.
ii. The approved SGOs are: Community Foundation of Elkhart County,
Institute for Quality Education, Inc. (Formerly Educational Choice
Charitable Trust), LaGrange County Community Foundation, Inc.,
Professional Athletes of Indiana, Sagamore Institute Scholarships for
Education Choice, School Scholarship Granting Organization of Northeast
Indiana, The Lutheran Scholarship Granting Organization of Indiana,
Tuition Assistance Fund of Southwestern Indiana (Closed February 2013).
iii. The student is a member of a household with an annual income equal to
or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced
lunch program.
Id.
393. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The student has a disability that requires special education and related
services; ii. An IEP pursuant to IC 20-35 or a Service Plan (SP) pursuant to
511 IAC 7-34 has been developed for the student; and, iii. The student is a
member of a household with an annual income equal to or below 200% of
the amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch program.
Id.
394. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The student would be required to attend a specific public school based on
his/her residence that has been assigned an “F” grade. The list of F schools
for Choice Scholarship eligibility is posted prior to the beginning of the
school year. Note: This pathway does not require prior attendance at the
school. ii. The student is a member of a household with an annual income
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Semesters in Public School Pathway;395 (7) Sibling Pathway;396 and (8)
Pre-K Pathway.397 A student must satisfy the financial and situational
criteria of one of the eight pathways to receive the scholarship
funds.398 Notably, there is no requirement that a child attend a
public school prior to applying for the private school program.
Furthermore, the scholarship award is the lesser of: (1) tuition and
fees at the participating private school chosen; or, (2) “an amount
based off the per-student State funding formula for the student’s
school corporation of residence,” depending on the family income.399
The Indiana Department of Education pays the scholarship directly to
the school, but requires the child’s parent or guardian to endorse the
award.400 Based on these requirements, in 2016, roughly sixty percent of
Indiana school children were eligible for the program.401

equal to or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the federal free or
reduced lunch program.
Id.
395. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The student was enrolled in kindergarten through grade 12 in a public
school, including a charter school, in Indiana for at least two semesters
immediately preceding the first semester for which the individual receives a
Choice Scholarship, and ii. The student is a member of a household with an
annual income equal to or below 150% of the amount to qualify for the
federal free or reduced lunch program.
Id.
396. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The sibling of the newly applying student received either a Choice
Scholarship or an SGO Scholarship in a previous school year, including a
school year that does not immediately precede the school year for which the
student is applying for a Choice Scholarship; and ii. The student is a member
of a household with an annual income equal to or below 150% of the
amount to qualify for the federal free or reduced lunch program.
Id.
397. Eligibility Requirements:
i. The student received and used an Early Education Grant under IC 12-17.27.2 to attend Pre-K at an eligible Choice [S]chool. ii. The student is applying
for a Choice Scholarship at the same Choice [S]chool in which they
attended Pre-K with an Early Education Grant. iii. The student is a member
of a household with annual income equal to or below 69% of the reduced
lunch eligibility (127% of the federal poverty level).
Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. This arrangement is likely to comply with the Zelman-Harris decision that
vouchers are permissible because they indirectly aid religious institutions because
they directly aid the parent/students. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
401. Brown & McLaren, supra note 387.
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In addition to the students meeting certain eligibility requirements,
participating schools also have threshold requirements. The Indiana
Choice Program requires a participating school to meet minimal
requirements and prohibits any state agency, including the Indiana
Department of Education, from regulating the educational program
of private schools receiving state funds from the program.402 A
nonpublic school is eligible to receive state funds if it: (1) is located in
Indiana; (2) requires an eligible student to pay tuition; (3) voluntarily
agrees to enroll the student; (4) is accredited by either the state board
or a national or regional accreditation agency; (5) administers
statewide assessments, at state expense; (6) is not a school that an
eligible student has a legal settlement with; and (7) submits required
student performance data to the state.403 State law expressly prohibits
the Indiana Department of Education, or any other state agency, from
regulating the educational programs of participating schools. This
includes the curriculum, religious instruction or activities, classroom
teaching, and hiring of teachers.404
Indiana has adopted few provisions to govern the Special Education
Pathway program.405 First, Indiana has not adopted express nondiscrimination requirements for participating schools, so the private
schools have a significant amount of agency and independence in
admissions decisions.406 Private schools are only limited in discrimination
against students with special needs by the public accommodations
provision under Title III of the ADA.407 Since religious private schools
are exempt from the ADA,408 these schools are free to discriminate
against students with disabilities in their admission decisions.409 Since
ninety-seven percent of the private schools that will participate in the
Indiana program in 2018–2019 are religious entities, the ADA

402. IND. CODE § 20-51-4-1(a) (2017).
403. Id. § 20-51-1-4.7.
404. Id. § 20-51-4-1.
405. See id. § 20-51-4. The only sections addressing special education are Sections
20-51-4-4(2), 20-51-4-4.5, and 20-51-4-4.6. Id.
406. See id. § 20-51-4-3 (requiring schools to not discriminate based only on “race,
color, or national origin”); Cory Turner, Indiana’s School Choice Program Often
Underserves Special Needs Students, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 15, 2017, 4:34 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/15/528502918/indianas-school-choice-programoften-underserves-special-needs-students (noting that private schools can base admissions
on grade point average, religion, or the sexual orientation of the student’s parents).
407. See discussion infra Part IV.
408. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2017).
409. See Turner, supra note 406.
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protections are, for practical purposes, essentially nonexistent for
students who participate in the program.410
Second, because the IDEA does not apply to private schools, the
Indiana Department of Education created a skeletal counterpart to
the IEP,411 which is a Choice Scholarship Education Plan (CSEP), that
governs a Choice School acting as the child’s special education
service provider.412 However, Indiana has not extended any of the
procedural protections to students of disabilities and their parents
For example, the Indiana
that are codified in the IDEA.413
Department of Education’s web site for special education services
deceptively outlines the rights that parents waive under the voucher
program.414 The Indiana Department of Education minimizes the
loss as merely the right to “specific notices for case conference
committee meetings” and to “established timelines within which the
public school must do various things.”415 It does not mention the loss
of the right to free appropriate public education, and it glosses over
the due process protections in the IDEA.416 Moreover, the program
requires parents to first file any complaint regarding the CSEP with the
Choice School before they can file the complaint with the Indiana
Department of Education.417
B. The Indiana Program: Realities for Disabled Children
For the 2018–2019 school year, the Indiana Department of Education
lists 306 participating private schools in the Choice Scholarship
410. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS (Jan. 26,
2018), https://www.doe.in.gov/choice/2018-2019-participating-choice-schools.
411. According to the Indiana Department of Education:
An IEP is much more comprehensive, contains more details, and is designed
to ensure that a student receives a [FAPE] . . . An SP is similar to an IEP, but
is not required to include all the components of an IEP. For example, an
IEP must include statements about how and when the students will
participate with nondisabled students and the student’s need for an
extended school year, as well as identify the student’s placement in the least
restrictive environment. An SP does not require these components.
CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389.
412. Id.
413. Id.; see also Dana Goldstein, Special Ed School Vouchers May Come with Hidden
Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/us/schoolvouchers-disability.html.
414. See CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FAQS, supra note 389.
415. Id.
416. Id.; supra note 411; see Goldstein, supra note 413 (stating that voucher users
lose the right to a hearing to challenge disciplinary conduct toward a child).
417. 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-49-7 (West 2016).
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Program.418 Fewer than ten are non-religious or faith-based.419 Of the
non-religious affiliated schools, only one, the Independence Academy of
Indiana, was explicitly created to serve children with disabilities.420 This
school is designed to serve “middle school and high school students with
high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome.”421 The tuition for
Independence Academy is over $14,000 per year, so a Choice Scholarship
Voucher through the Special Education Program would cover less than half
the tuition for this school.422
None of Indiana’s top private special needs schools participate in the
state’s voucher program.423 Notably, Indiana’s Fortune Academy,424
listed as one of the best fifty private special needs schools by special
education professionals,425 is not a participating school. The Academy
offers a variety of private financial aid opportunities for families to pay
the tuition, but the Choice Scholarship is not one of them.426 Two of
the other private schools designed to serve children with disabilities,
Indiana—Midwest Academy and Worthmore Academy, do not
disclose the cost of tuition on their websites, but do caution parents
of the onerous cost.427

418. 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. About, INDEPENDENCE ACAD., https://www.iaindiana.org/about-ia (last visited
Aug. 17, 2018).
422. Tuition + Fees, INDEPENDENCE ACAD., https://www.iaindiana.org/tuition-fees/
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
423. Indiana
Special
Education
Private
Schools,
PRIV.
SCH.
REV.,
https://www.privateschoolreview.com/indiana/special-education-private-schools (last
visited Aug. 17, 2018); see 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410.
424. Fortune Academy is committed to serving students with a variety of
disabilities, including Attention Deficit Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactive
Disorder, dyslexia, and anxiety disorders. Who We Are, FORTUNE ACAD.,
https://www.thefortuneacademy.org/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 5, 2018). Fortune
Academy’s annual tuition is $17,250 for first through eighth grade, and $19,250 for
ninth through twelfth grade. Tuition, FORTUNE ACAD., https://www.thefortune
academy.org/tuition (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
425. The 50 Best Private Special Needs Schools in the U.S., MASTERS IN SPECIAL EDUC.
PROGRAM GUIDE, https://www.masters-in-special-education.com/50-best-private-specialneeds-schools (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter MASTERS PROGRAM].
426. Id.
427. Financial Assistance, MIDWEST ACAD., https://www.mymwa.org/admissions/
financial-assistance (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (noting that although its tuition is “set
at approximately $10,000 less than the national average of schools serving children
with learning style differences, the cost of a private education is an [onerous]
obligation for many families“); About Us, WORTHMORE ACAD., http://www.worthmore
academy.org/about-us.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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An examination of the websites of participating private schools
reveals that an overwhelming number of these schools are free to
discriminate against children with disabilities by excluding them from
admission.428 Approximately ninety-seven percent of the private
schools participating in the Indiana Choice Program for the 2017–
2018 school year are exempt from the non-discrimination provisions
of the ADA because they identify as a religious organization.429 Some
of these schools already accept federal funds from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) to support school lunch programs,430 and are

428. See 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410; Turner, supra note
406. Many private schools impose academic requirements, standardized test scores, and
interview requirements for admission that may bar some students with disabilities. See,
e.g., Admissions Checklist (Grades 7–12), BLACKHAWK CHRISTIAN SCH., http://www.blackhawk
christian.org/downloads/Admissions-Philosophy-Expectations-Policies-7-12.pdf (last visited
Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing how “high academic standards and equally challenging
expectations” means that the Blackhawk Christian School “is not the best learning
environment for every student”); Enrollment Policy, EMMANUEL-ST. MICHAEL LUTHERAN SCH.,
https://www.esmeagles.com/enrollment/steps-to-enroll (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (“The
transfer student’s records (report cards, standardized test results, individual
education plans) must be provided to Emmanuel-St. Michael Lutheran School for
enrollment and must indicate that the student has a reasonable expectation for
success at Emmanuel-St. Michael. Additional academic screening may be
required.”); Admissions Policy, ST. PETER’S LUTHERAN CHURCH & SCH., http://
www.stpetersfw.org/school/admissions/825-admissions-policy (last visited Aug. 17,
2018) ("Admission to St. Peter’s Lutheran School is dependent upon St. Peter’s
having the appropriate academic program/educational plan that fits the student. St.
Peter’s Lutheran School may or may not be equipped to service the educational
needs of students with disabilities. Students with Individualized Education Plans
require individualized review and approval for admission."); Application for Enrollment
Concordia Lutheran School, CONCORIDA LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL, https://www.
clhscadets.com/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=303585&type=d&pREC_ID=867926
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (requiring disclosure of special education status and
records on first page of application). Notably, the Concordia Lutheran School
Handbook describes how resource teachers will help families receive “auxiliary
services” through the support of the public school district in the following areas:
“learning disabilities service, psychological services, and speech correction,” inferring
that students with other special needs would not be admitted. See 2017–2018 School
Handbook, CONCORDIA LUTHERAN SCHOOL, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b7a825_
a42aae2d9fef4a5ebb151e4c64033e3c.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
429. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2017).
430. Compare Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), IND. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 30,
2018), https://www.doe.in.gov/nutrition/community-eligibility-provision-cep (click
on “CEP Site List SY 17–18”) (displaying the schools that participate in the National
School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs), with 2018–2019 PARTICIPATING
CHOICE SCHOOLS, supra note 410 (listing the schools that accept vouchers).
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therefore subject to section 504’s non-discrimination provisions.431
Some of the religious schools accepting these funds solely mention
disability in the generic anti-discrimination disclaimer on their school
lunch pages.432 These schools do not discuss or list any special education
personnel or programming.433
Furthermore, the admission policies and practices of many private
schools participating in the Choice Scholarships Program involve either
explicit or implicit discrimination against students with disabilities.
One school’s admissions policy explicitly states that students with
disabilities face a more rigorous admissions process.434 The school’s
website states, “St. Peter’s Lutheran School may or may not be
equipped to service the educational needs of students with
disabilities. Students with [IEPs] require individualized review and
approval for admission.”435 Several other schools employ an admission
process that is biased against children with disabilities due to onerous
application requirements. For instance, schools may require a certain
score on an entrance exam, disclosure of an IEP, or an in-person
interview.436 These admissions requirements likely allow the school to
weed out students with disabilities because they may not meet certain
admission criteria, such as standardized test score thresholds.437

431. Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Dollars to Discriminate: The (Un)intended Consequences of
School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537, 543–52 (2016) (stating that section 504
forbids federal funds recipients from discriminating against persons with disabilities).
432. See, e.g., Lunch Menus, SAINT PETER-IMMANUEL LUTHERAN SCH.,
http://www.stpeterimmanuellutheran.org/lunch-menus (last visited Aug 17, 2018)
(“In accordance with Federal Law and U.S. Department of Agriculture Policy, this
institution is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, age, or disability.”).
433. Id.
434. See Admissions Policy, ST. PETER’S LUTHERAN CHURCH & SCH., http://www.st
petersfw.org/school/admissions/825-admissions-policy (last visited Aug 17, 2018)
(explaining that admission is dependent upon the student fitting into St. Peter’s
current academic program).
435. Id.
436. See, e.g., School Admission Policy for Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend (Diocesan
Policy #4060), BISHOP DWENGER HIGH SCH., http://www.bishopdwenger.com/
Data/Accounts/Files/1/AdmittancePolcy6-21-17-AddedHomeschoolTransfer.pdf
(requiring that applicants take school-specific placement exams, disclose IEPs,
interview with a school administrator (if applying as a transfer student), and submit
recommendation forms from prior teachers).
437. See, e.g., Admissions FAQ, BREBEUF JESUIT PREPARATORY SCH., https://brebeuf.org
/admissions/faq (last visited Aug 17, 2018) (noting that a student must score at the
60th percentile on the High School Placement Test, a standardized test that all private
Catholic schools use in Indianapolis, to gain admission).
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While some participating schools decry the argument that they
“only pick the cream of the crop,”438 evidence suggests that these
participating schools are using these admissions criteria to exclude
children with disabilities.439 Some participating private schools still
allege “public schools are just better equipped to work with special
education students.”440 This practice of telling families of children
with disabilities that their school cannot serve the child’s needs may
account for the disparate enrollment rates of special education
students in public versus private schools in Indiana, despite the
Special Education Pathway voucher program. Across the state, public
schools are serving special education students at a rate of two-to-one
over their private school counterparts within the same district.441
The fact that special education students continue to enroll in
voucher schools at low rates is evidence that “choice” for children
with disabilities is just a fallacy. The 2016–2017 Choice Program
Annual Report reveals that less than four percent of participating
voucher students are using the Special Education Pathway.442 Further,
almost half of these students had never attended an Indiana Public
School. Thus, it is unlikely that parents of children with special needs
are choosing private schools because public schools failed their
children.443 Moreover, while enrollment in other voucher pathways is
increasing year over year, participation in the Special Education Pathway
has decreased every year since it was enacted in 2011.444
One reason for the decline in numbers could be the lack of
accountability participating Choice Schools have for the education they
are providing to students with disabilities.445 The IDEA’s mission was to
438. McLaren, supra note 387.
439. See Turner, supra note 406 (stating that although seventeen percent of public
school students in Indianapolis receive special education services, only seven percent
of Indianapolis students in voucher schools do).
440. Id.
441. Id. (reporting that in Indianapolis the ratio of public schools servicing special
education students to private schools is 2.4–-to–1 (17%–to–7%), and in Fort Wayne
the ratio is 2.3–to–1 (15%–to–6.5%).
442. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT:
PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 13 (2017) [hereinafter CSP ANNUAL REPORT].
443. Id. at 16 (documenting that of the 1140 students receiving vouchers through
the Special Education Pathway in the 2016–2017 school year, 525 students—or
46.05%—never attended an Indiana public school).
444. Id. at 13 (documenting that enrollment in the Special Education Pathway fell
from 1262 students in the 2014–2015 school year, to 1166 students in the 2015–2016
school year, and finally to 1140 students in the 2016–2017 school year).
445. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-94, PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE:
FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PARENTS ARE NOTIFIED ABOUT CHANGES IN RIGHTS

2018]

THE FALLACY OF CHOICE

1861

ensure students with disabilities not only received access to education,
but were also appropriately educated.446 There are no additional
accountability measures under the Special Education Pathway for
schools that agree to take state special education funding to serve
students with disabilities. Although the Choice Program provides
state special education funding to participating schools selected as
the “service provider,”—whether they use the Special Education
Pathway or any other pathway to access the voucher program—less
than twenty percent of participating students in 2016–2017 received
special education services at their private school.447 In other words,
only one in five children with disabilities who attend private school
on vouchers are actually receiving special education at the private
school. This may be because these schools are not adding the resources
necessary to support students with disabilities, despite the excess
funding, because they have no standards with which to comply.448
Regardless of which school is the designated service provider, the
performance of students with disabilities participating in the Choice
Program demonstrates a lack of meaningful educational opportunity.
Researchers from the University of Notre Dame and the University of
Kentucky studying the Indiana Choice Program found that special
education students receiving a voucher suffered significant losses in
reading and writing.449 Although the Indiana Department of Education
does not include information about specific reasons for retention,
studies of other voucher programs indicate that parents withdraw
their students from the private schools because of the lack of special
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 29 (2017) (“[I]n 2016-[20]17, more than [eighty]
percent of students in private choice programs designed for students with disabilities
were enrolled in a program that either provided no information about changes in
IDEA rights or provided some inaccurate information about these changes.”).
446. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“[The purpose of this act is] to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . .”).
447. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 17.
448. See id. (noting that a private school may receive state special education
funding if the school agrees to provide special education services to eligible Choice
Scholarship students, but the state legislation fails to specify the nature of those
special education services). Of the participating schools surveyed by the authors, only
one of the non-special needs participating Choice Schools’ websites discusses a
special education program. St. Charles Borromeo School has one special education
teacher. Faculty and Staff, St. Charles Borromeo Cath. Sch., www.stcharlesschoolfw.org/
faculty-and-staff.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
449. Marty Lueken, School Voucher Programs in Indiana and Louisiana, EDUC. NEXT
(June 28, 2017), http://educationnext.org/school-voucher-programs-indianalouisiana (“Special Education voucher students experience a loss of 0.13 standard
deviations in [English Language Arts] relative to their matched comparison students.”).
FOR
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education and related services offered.450 One mother of a child with
a disability who enrolled her daughter in a private school, withdrew
her daughter because her grades continued to fall, despite receiving
special education services from her local school district.451 The mother
expected the private school to use teaching methods and
accommodations specified in the program-mandated equivalent of an
IEP, but without oversight and accountability measures, the private
school did not comply with the plan.452 Moreover, the Indiana
Department of Education’s own review of the only federally funded
voucher program, the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, found
that “lack of special needs services” was a paramount concern cited by
parents that did not continue in the program.453
Finally, in practice, the Choice Program is taking precious
resources away from public school districts charged with the
mandates of the IDEA. In Fort Wayne alone, Indiana spends $20
million a year on tuition for voucher students.454 In the 2016–2017
school year, $1.1 million of the $20 million went to a single private
K–8 school, St. Jude Catholic.455 In a 2014 formal presentation, the
450. See THE MANHATTAN INST., VOUCHERS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS: AN
EVALUATION OF FLORIDA’S MCKAY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, 21 (2003), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/cr_38.pdf (recording that only 49.3% of former participants in the
Florida McKay Scholarship program responded that their private school provided all
the special education services it promised to provide); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
EVALUATION OF THE DC OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 24–26 (2010),
https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104018/pdf/20104018.pdf (finding that 22% of
parents were unable to find a participating school that offered services for their
child’s special needs) [hereinafter DC OSP].
451. Mindy McLaren, For Indiana Special-Education Students, Choice Comes at a Cost,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/forindiana-special-education-students-choice-comes-at-a-cost/2016/12/26/3b875480c3bc-11e6-9a51-cd56ea1c2bb7.
452. See id. The private school posted the child’s confidential education plan on
the wall to encourage compliance. Id. This action itself shows the lack of official
oversight in private schools because the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
prohibits schools receiving federal funds from making public student education
records without parental permission. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA), U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. https://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa (last
visited Aug. 17, 2018). Ultimately, the mother concluded a public program with
teachers trained in special education was the best place to serve her daughter’s
educational needs. McLaren, supra note 451.
453. DC OSP, supra note 450 (revealing that 12.3% of parents cited “lack of special
needs services” as their initial reason for leaving the scholarship program).
454. Cory Turner, The Promise and Peril of School Vouchers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May
12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/05/12/520111511/thepromise-and-peril-of-school-vouchers.
455. Id.

2018]

THE FALLACY OF CHOICE

1863

head of the church championed the voucher program as a solution
to the church’s budgetary hardships.456 Furthermore, in 2011, the
first year of the Choice Program, less than six percent of the students
enrolled at St. Jude participated in the voucher program. As of 2017,
over sixty percent of the school is on a Choice Program voucher.457
In 2016–2017, nearly fifty-five percent of Choice students had never
attended an Indiana public school.458 Thus, Indiana Choice Program
is diverting the funds of the notoriously-strapped state education
budget459 away from public schools—and therefore public school
students—to pay for the religious-based education of students who
were never a part of the public school system.
In conclusion, the Indiana Choice Program demonstrates that the
promises of school choice proponents do not actualize for students
with disabilities. These children are easily excluded from private schools
on the basis of their disability. Many private schools specializing in special
education do not participate in the program. Moreover, even if they did,
a voucher would cover a fraction of the tuition. Most importantly, the
limited evidence available on student performance reveals that students
with disabilities who participate in the voucher programs—at a
significantly higher cost than the value of the vouchers—are academically
disadvantaged by the Choice Scholarship Program.
Indiana’s voucher program is therefore not a feasible option for any
parent who cares about the educational well-being of their disabled
child. These parents have no choice but to keep their children in the
state public education system, and the current voucher system
continually funnels public school funds to private schools which do not
service students with disabilities. Therefore, parents of children with
disabilities will find it more and more difficult to find schools adequately
prepared to provide the intensive resources their children need.

456. Id. The video of the presentation was later removed from the parish’s website. Id.
457. Id. (“This year [2017], according to state data, nearly two-thirds of St. Jude’s
students now receive public dollars to help pay for their private school tuition.”).
458. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 15 (recording that 18,732 of 34,299
students in the program during the 2016–2017 school year had “No Record of
Attending an Indiana Public School”).
459. Indiana received a “C+” in state funding for education in 2018 Education Week
Quality Points report. Quality Counts, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/
collections/quality-counts-2018-state-grades/report-card-map-rankings.html.
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IV. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FEDERAL VOUCHERS ON
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
The realities of the Indiana Choice Program demonstrate the harm
that voucher programs can do to students with disabilities.460
Federally funded vouchers would be a disaster for the education of
children with disabilities both on an individual and national level
because it would undermine the progress made under the IDEA over
the last forty years. If the federal government models a voucher
program on the Indiana system, private schools would be free to
openly discriminate against children with disabilities—both in their
admissions policies and in reduction in services for students who are
admitted. Moreover, evidence indicates that children with disabilities
who participate in a federal voucher program will not have improved
access to private special needs programs.461 The evidence also shows
that even if children with disabilities do have access to a private
special needs program via a federal voucher program, they will likely
regress academically—presumably because such private special needs
programs do not have to comply with the IDEA’s strict mandates.462
At a national level, students with disabilities will be injured by segregation,
further reductions in funding, and removal of the IDEA protections.
A. Children with Disabilities will Suffer Harm Under a
Federally Funded Voucher Program
First, a federally funded voucher program will hurt students with
disabilities because private schools have significant authority to
exclude these students from their programs. As discussed above,
private schools are exempt from the IDEA and have only minimal
obligations under section 504 and under the ADA. Under either section
504 or the ADA, even non-religious private schools may exclude a child with
a disability if doing so would fundamentally alter their program or would
cause an undue hardship to the school.463 Moreover, nearly eighty percent
of the private schools in America are exempt from these laws because they
fit under the definition of “religious organizations.”464
460. See supra Section III.B.
461. Lex Frieden, School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY (Apr. 15, 2003), https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/April152003 (identifying
potential consequences of a federal voucher program, including the lack of access to
this type of program for disadvantaged families).
462. Id.
463. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2016).
464. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (citing an ED survey detailing the
number of “religious” private schools in the United States).
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Second, students with disabilities can only access a federally funded
voucher if they waive all the procedural safeguards and disciplinary
protections set forth in the IDEA. Although Endrew F. revitalized the
IDEA, this is a Pyrrhic victory for any child with a disability who
accepts a voucher. In accepting a voucher, a child with a disability
loses the right to free appropriate public education, the right to
special education and related services they would have in the public
school system, the right to a highly qualified special education instructor,
and the right to a hearing to dispute disciplinary actions.465 Moreover,
evidence indicates most parents do not realize what they are implicitly
waiving by accepting a voucher.466 There is no procedural notice
requirement to gain informed consent of the parents before giving
them a voucher that terminates their IDEA rights.
Third, most private schools created specifically to serve students with
particular disabilities are cost prohibitive. Advocates for vouchers argue
that they help children with disabilities access private schools created to
serve special needs students without a lengthy due process hearing to
gain reimbursement. But most of these schools are prohibitively
expensive, if they even participate in a voucher program. As discussed
above, the preeminent private special needs schools in Indiana do not
participate in the Choice Program.467 The single participating school for
children with high-functioning autism would cost roughly $10,000 a year
after a voucher,468 a significant hurdle considering eighty percent of
participating families have a household income of $75,000 or less
annually,469 and the costs of raising a child with a disability are
quadruple the cost of a typically developing child.470
Furthermore, private schools designed for children with significant
support needs are often four times more expensive than other special
needs private schools. The current tuition for Denver’s excellent
Firefly Autism—the private school whose tuition the plaintiffs sought

465. See Goldstein, supra note 413 (detailing the rights given up, often
unknowingly, by parents participating in the voucher programs).
466. See id. (“By accepting the vouchers, families may be unknowingly giving up
their rights to the very help they were hoping to gain.”).
467. See supra notes 418–420 and accompanying text (detailing the small number
of private schools in Indiana participating in the Choice Program, and of those only
one is a non-religious school focusing on Special Needs children).
468. See supra notes 421–422 and accompanying text (examining Indiana’s
Independence Academy, a school serving children with Autism).
469. CSP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 23.
470. Craig Guillot, The Cost of Raising a Special Needs Child, MINT LIFE BLOG (July 23,
2013), https://blog.mint.com/planning/the-cost-of-raising-a-special-needs-child-0713.

1866

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1673

reimbursement for in Endrew F.—is $70,000 a year.471 The Joshua
School, a nationally-acclaimed school serving children with Autism
Spectrum Disorder, has a similar tuition rate.472 Both programs are
designed to serve children with more significant needs, which
requires highly trained staff, highly individualized classrooms, very
small teacher to child ratios, and other therapeutic professionals.473
Even if a federally funded voucher covered ten percent of that cost,
the majority of families in America could not afford to cover the rest
of the cost of these therapeutic programs. This is why it is imperative
to maintain the IDEA provision that allows parents to request that the
public school district pay the child’s tuition at one of these schools.
The cost of tuition at private schools with established special education
programs will often be less than the cost of the district providing all the
necessary specialized services and staff within the public school system.
Fourth, a voucher program would further harm students with
disabilities by taking more students with disabilities out of an inclusive
environment. Students with disabilities make the most progress when
they are in an inclusive environment—that is, when they are integrated
into classrooms with students without disabilities.474 Ending the
segregation of children with disabilities in the American education
system was the primary purpose behind the IDEA.475 Congress
recognized that students with disabilities learn better when they are
integrated with their peers—just as the Supreme Court found over
seventy years ago in Brown v. Board of Education476 that black students
receive a better education when they are not segregated from their
471. John Aguilar, Douglas County Schools Must Pay the Private Education Costs of
Student who has Autism, Judge Rules, DENVER POST (Feb. 12, 2018, 4:54 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/12/douglas-county-schools-privateeducation-costs (noting that in total, the Endrew plaintiffs may be entitled to upwards
of seven figures in education reimbursement by the state).
472. Amy Bounds, Boulder’s Joshua School for Students with Autism Opens, DAILY
CAMERA (Jan. 19, 2013, 12:00 PM), www.dailycamera.com/ci_22405355/bouldersjoshua-school-students-autism-opens.
473. Joshua School: School-Age Program, JOSHUA SCH., https://joshuaschool.org/schoolage-program (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
474. Thomas Hehir, A Summary of the Evidence on Inclusive Education, INSTITUTION
ALANA (2016), https://alana.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/A_Summmary_of_
the_evidence_on_inclusive_education.pdf (“A large body of research indicates that
included students develop stronger skills in reading and mathematics, have higher
rates of attendance, are less likely to have behavioral problems, and are more likely
to complete secondary school than students who have not been included.”).
475. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (recognizing the main goal in
enacting IDEA was to combat the segregation of disabled children).
476. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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white peers.477 As special education and legal expert Wendy Hensel
points out, “daily interaction . . . with their typical peers diminishes the
stigma of otherness associated with disability and normalizes children’s
understanding of impairments.”478 Inclusive opportunities for children
with disabilities has such profound positive results for student
achievement that even intensive needs institutions that cater
specifically to students with a particular disability work to create
interaction with typical peers whenever possible.479
B. National Harm of Federally Funded Vouchers
A federally funded voucher program will re-segregate education in
America, leaving the children with the most significant needs in the
ever-more-underfunded public school system. The history of vouchers
is tied to a desire to segregate students from those perceived to be the
“other.”480 Due to the ability to discriminate against children with
disabilities and lack of accountability for private participating schools
to properly educate children with disabilities under the IDEA, a
voucher program will likely leave children with moderate to severe
disabilities relegated to the public school system. This concern is
evocatively encapsulated by Senator Maggie Hassan, the mother of
child with a disability and vocal opponent of Secretary DeVos, who
warns against vouchers having “the potential for turning our public
schools into warehouses for the most challenging kids with
disabilities.”481 In fact, a McKay Scholarship official remarked he was
not concerned by the lack of special education resources in private
schools accepting this voucher “because about 85% of McKay
voucher recipients have only a mild learning disability.”482
Additionally, diverting the limited federal funds from the public
school system lessens the resources these schools have to serve
students with disabilities. The federal government provides less than
ten percent of the funding for public education across the country.483
477. Id. at 495.
478. Hensel, supra note 5, at 341.
479. See Aubyn C. Stahmer et al., Inclusion for Toddlers with Autism Spectrum
Disorders, AUTISM (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4031244. Firefly Autism and The Joshua School Early Childhood Center both run
inclusion programs.
480. See supra Section I.A (discussing “Segregation Academies”).
481. Turner, supra note 406.
482. Hensel, supra note 5, at 323.
483. See
The
Federal
Role
in
Education,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last modified May 25, 2017)
(estimating the “[f]ederal contribution to elementary and secondary education” to
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Moreover, the federal government has not fully funded the IDEA
since it was enacted484 and has received a “C” grade by influential
quality analysts, “reflect[ing] continued struggles with achievement
and funding gaps.”485 State school funding is often based on a
combination of local property taxes and any additional funding that a
strapped legislature can find in its budget; it is not derived from the
estimated costs of providing an adequate education to children across
America.486 If private schools need additional funding to provide a proper
education, they can increase tuition. Public schools do not have that luxury.
Finally, encouraging parents to use a voucher, rather than assert
their rights under the IDEA, allows systemic problems in public
school systems to go unchecked. After Douglas County Public
Schools lost the Endrew F. case, the Board of Education finally took
years of complaints from special education parents seriously.487 The
School Board recently created a Special Education Advisory Task
Force, made up of staff, parents, and community members, to
identify “strengths, needs and goals of current special education
services” with recommendations for the future.488 Additionally, the
ED Office of Civil Rights investigated and resolved thirty cases of
systemic disability discrimination in the public school system since
2009.489 If parents are encouraged to take a voucher, systemic
maltreatment of students with disabilities by school districts across the
country will go unhampered.
C. Lack of Options for Children with Disabilities
Given the significant individual and global consequences a federally
funded voucher program imposes on students with disabilities, it is

be eight percent, including funding from the ED and other federal agencies, such as
the Department of Agriculture’s School Lunch program).
484. BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 166, at 20.
485. Quality Counts 2018 Redoubles Focus on State-by-State K–12 Systems, EDUC. WK.
RES. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/collections/quality-counts2018-state-grades/report-card-map-rankings.html.
486. Cory Turner et al., Why America’s Schools Have a Money Problem, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/whyamericas-schools-have-a-money-problem.
487. Alex DeWind, School Board Approves Special Education Task Force, CASTLE ROCK
NEWS-PRESS (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:15 AM), http://castlerocknewspress.net/stories/
school-board-approves-special-education-task-force,258102.
488. Id.
489. More Case Resolutions Regarding Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/caseresolutions/m-disabilitycr.html (last modified Nov. 4, 2016).
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important to explore the potential outcomes for these children. While
the optimum outcome, from the perspective of children with
disabilities, would be for the Trump administration to drop its pursuit
of a federally funded voucher program, this seems highly unlikely.
The Trump administration could attempt to create some extended
protections for children with disabilities; however, these would likely
fail. Or the legislature could override any policy change the Trump
administration takes, although this is not likely given the current
stagnation of Congress. That leaves the pursuit of litigation as a
potential path for children with disabilities to block federally funded
vouchers. This section explores each of the above options in turn.
First, there is the possibility the Trump administration will realize
the conflict a federally funded voucher program creates with IDEA
enforcement and will decline to move forward with a federally
funded program. However, this is not a likely outcome given the
policy decisions and public comments made by Secretary DeVos.490
Most notably, Secretary DeVos has pushed a free-market agenda for
education by lessening regulations put in place by the Obama
administration to protect students from for-profit universities, and by
freezing regulations designed to forgive student loans based on
fraudulent promises by a college or university.491 Additionally,
Secretary DeVos has continued to undermine civil rights protections
in the education system by rescinding Obama-era guidance to protect
transgender student rights and sexual assault victims on college
campuses and reducing staffing and investigations at the ED Office of
Civil Rights.492 While these decisions do not directly affect students
with disabilities, this removal of protections for other vulnerable
students does raise the question of whether she will similarly decline
to protect students with disabilities—especially when she views those

490. See infra note 527 and accompanying text (detailing Secretary DeVos’ push
for a free-market education system); infra note 493 and accompanying text
(exploring Secretary DeVos’ comments on the privatization of American education).
491. See, e.g., Erica L. Green, DeVos to Eliminate Rules Aimed at Abuses by For-Profit
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/
us/politics/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges.html; Erica L. Green, DeVos Proposes to
Curtail Debt Relief for Defrauded Students, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/betsy-devos-debt-relief-for-profitcolleges.html; Ella Nilsen & Carly Sitrin, How Betsy DeVos is Quietly Erasing Obama’s
Education Legacy, VOX (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/10/2/16229474/devos-erasing-obamas-education-legacy.
492. Id.
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protections as getting in the way of her single-minded agenda to
privatize education.493
Second, the Trump administration could rescind earlier guidance
that exempts private schools from the IDEA and other disability laws,
and extend the entire portfolio of rights enshrined in the IDEA to
any private school accepting federal voucher funding.
While
Secretary DeVos seemed to assert a belief that federal law should
follow federal funds in her confirmation hearing494—after
demonstrating, it must be noted, a fundamental lack of knowledge
about the IDEA—her continued rollback of protections indicates this
is an unlikely path.495 Given that President Trump celebrates his
unprecedented reduction of regulations on the private sector,
extending any regulations is unlikely in this administration. To
support this initiative, Secretary DeVos pledged to rescind 600
guidance documents by the ED, including seventy-two guidance
documents by the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services explicitly outlining the rights of students with disabilities.496
While the Trump administration argued that all of the 672 guidance
documents were “out of date,” many advocates argued that the move
undermines critical protections for minority and disabled students.497

493. Stahl, supra note 1.
494. Michelle Diament, Trump Education Pick Seemingly ‘Confused’ About IDEA,
DISABILITY SCOOP (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/01/
18/trump-education-pick-idea/23198 (“Federal law must be followed where federal
dollars are in play.”); Katie Reilly, Here’s a Look at the Education Questions Betsy DeVos
Struggled to Answer, TIME (Jan. 18, 2017), http://time.com/4637642/betsy-devosconfirmation-education-policy.
495. Valerie Strauss, Six Astonishing Things Betsy DeVos Said—and Refused to Say—at Her
Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/18/six-astonishing-things-betsy-devos-said-andrefused-to-say-at-her-confirmation-hearing (describing the interaction between Secretaryto-be DeVos and Senator Hassan when Hassan stated that she was “upset that
[DeVos] didn’t understand the [IDEA] and urged her to learn more about it”).
496. Lauren Camera, Education Department to Withdraw 600 ‘Out-of-Date’ Guidance
Documents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.usnews.
com/news/education-news/articles/2017-10-27/education-department-to-withdraw600-out-of-date-guidance-documents; see also Moriah Balingit, DeVos Rescinds 72
Guidance Documents Outlining Rights for Disabled Students, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/10/21/devos-rescinds72-guidance-documents-outlining-rights-for-disabled-students.
497.
There can be no further question: Secretary DeVos is dead set on rolling
back all the progress we’ve made for our children of color and students
with disabilities . . . . If Secretary DeVos indeed moves forward with this
action, she will be pushing IDEA’s promise of educational equity further
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Given the likelihood a federally funded voucher program will move
forward without extending the protections for students with
disabilities, what options, if any, do these children have in the courts?
Although the United Nations recognizes education as a fundamental
human right,498 the Supreme Court held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez499
that there is no fundamental right to education under the U.S.
Constitution.500 The best option for students with disabilities could be
to return to the argument that helped create the IDEA in the first
place: equal protection of the laws under the U.S. Constitution.
Children with disabilities and their families could challenge a federally
funded voucher program that does not extend the protections of the
IDEA to private schools under the Equal Protection Clause. This option
is discussed in detail in Part V below.
The Supreme Court has accepted equal protection claims brought
on behalf of children in a variety of contexts. The landmark case on
educational rights and equality in the United States, Brown v. Board of
Education,501 addressed the inequitable treatment of children of color
in public schools, and the harmful effects of a segregated school
system.502 The Supreme Court has also held that laws treating children
differently based on the non-marital status of their parents violated the
Equal Protection Clause, because these laws discriminate against
children on the basis of a characteristic entirely beyond their control.503
The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in another education
case, Plyler v. Doe,504 striking down a Texas law that sought to prohibit
the children of immigrants from attending public schools.505 In Plyler,
the Supreme Court recognized that although education is not a
fundamental right, a policy that prohibits children from schools

out of reach, worsening the school to prison pipeline, and so much more—
with students of all ages and backgrounds paying the price.
Camera, supra note 496.
498. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 26 (Dec.
10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to education.”).
499. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973).
500. Id. at 35 (holding that “[e]ducation . . . is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under [the] Federal Constitution”).
501. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
502. Id. at 494–95.
503. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968) (holding the Equal Protection Clause protects
“illegitimate” children from discrimination); see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
504. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
505. Id. at 220.
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because of circumstances entirely beyond the child’s control is an
impermissible violation of the Equal Protection Clause.506
Based on these precedents and absent a change in the current
political climate, an equal protection claim brought on behalf of
children with disabilities could be the only plausible way to block a
federally funded voucher program, and thereby ensure these
children continue to have equal access to educational opportunities.
A federally funded voucher program purporting to improve educational
outcomes for U.S. children that does not extend IDEA protections to
private schools participating in the program inherently excludes
children with disabilities from meaningful access to these opportunities.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS AGAINST
FEDERALLY FUNDED VOUCHERS
An alternative to political resistance to school vouchers programs is a
constitutional challenge. Though the Supreme Court has rejected
arguments that voucher programs involving religious schools violate the
Establishment Clause, the de facto exclusion of children with disabilities
provides another avenue for constitutional challenge. Parents could
argue that requiring students with disabilities to give up their
educational rights as a precondition to joining a school voucher
program—either state or federal—is a violation of fundamental rights and
of equal protection under the U.S. Constitution.
Such challenges would face significant obstacles, however, at least
under a traditional application of the Supreme Court’s fundamental
rights and equal protection jurisprudence. For the most part, a claim
under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause
lives or dies by the standard of review applied.507 If the court applies
traditional rational basis review, the challenged action is “overwhelmingly
likely to be upheld,” as it need only be rationally related to serve a
legitimate government purpose.508 The Supreme Court has invalidated
only a small number of government actions under this test.509 Conversely,

506. Id.
507. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727, 732 (5th ed. 2017).
508. Id. at 732.
509. Id. (explaining that the strong deference to a government action under the
rational basis test is due to the low burden on the government to prove a legitimate
government purpose); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding
that the criminalization of sodomy failed the rational basis test and served no
legitimate government purpose); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that discriminated against persons with
mental disabilities after finding the ordinance served no legitimate government purpose).
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if the court applied heightened scrutiny—especially strict scrutiny—the
challenged law was doomed to fall.510 As has been often repeated, the
highest level of scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”511
A. Heightened Scrutiny
A challenge to the school voucher programs by students with
disabilities would therefore have a very high chance of success if a
court could be persuaded to apply strict scrutiny with respect to either
fundamental rights or equal protection. Neither of these is likely,
however. Take fundamental rights first. In order for strict scrutiny to
apply to a claimed violation of the substantive Due Process Clause,
the challenged law must infringe upon a fundamental right;
otherwise, rational basis review applies.512 Unfortunately for disability
rights advocates, and the students themselves, the Supreme Court has
ruled that education is not a fundamental right.513 In order for strict
scrutiny to apply to a fundamental rights challenge, the Court would
have to overrule its own precedent and hold that education is, in fact,
a fundamental constitutional right.
1. Classification of vouchers as discriminatory
The duty to provide equal protection of the law also extends to
equally conferring benefits on citizens. However, the likelihood of
courts applying heightened scrutiny to de facto exclusionary school
voucher programs under an equal protection challenge is also slim,
for several reasons. First, while the school voucher programs place a
greater burden on children with disabilities, the programs do not
expressly exclude children with disabilities. For a law to be characterized
as discriminatory on the basis of a particular characteristic—in this case,

510. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 727.
511. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection Clause, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972).
512. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297–
98 (2006) (concluding that parents do not have the right to reimbursement all costs
resulting from litigation against a child’s school district); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37–39 (1973) (holding that because education is not a
fundamental right, funding to a school district does not need to be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny analysis); CHERMINSKY, supra note 507, at 727–32 (identifying the
differing levels of scrutiny that the Supreme Court may apply).
513. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
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disability—the law must either (1) be facially discriminatory, or (2) have
both a disparate effect and a discriminatory purpose.514
As described above, school voucher programs that require students
with disabilities to sign away most, if not all, of their educational
rights have a substantial disparate impact on these students.515 To
describe the disparate impact, this section will use the Indiana
voucher program as a proxy for a federally funded voucher program
because it is the largest in the nation and most closely connected to
the Trump administration—and therefore likely to be used as a
model for a federal voucher program.516
A federally funded voucher program akin to Indiana’s Choice
Program will have a disparate impact on students with disabilities for
a variety of reasons that are described above.517 Several of these
burdens are worth emphasizing here, because they are tantamount to
de facto exclusion of students with disabilities. First, the Indiana
program prohibits participating schools from discriminating in their
admission requirements. However, the bases on which discrimination
is prohibited are limited to “race, color, or national origin.”518 In other

514. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that a
discriminatory effect by itself is not enough to invalidate a government action); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 754 (explaining that different constitutional
analyses are required depending on whether the law is facially neutral or not);
Mitchell F. Rice, The Discriminatory Purpose Standard in Racial Discrimination Litigation:
From Yick Wo to Arlington Heights, 10 S.U. L. REV. 219, 231, 234 (1983) (quoting in part
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 33 (1969)(“[The] ‘Equal
protection’ radar . . . blips whenever a government seems (a) to be ‘classifying’
persons so as to extend to them unequal treatments, or (b) otherwise to be acting in
a way which results in systematic inequality in treatments received by definable
groups of persons.”); see generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once
and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1080–83 (2011) (noting
that requiring a discriminatory purpose on top of a discriminatory effect greatly
limits a court’s ability to deal with inequities in government actions).
515. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 413 (explaining the effects that school voucher
programs have on students with disabilities).
516. Valerie Strauss, How Mike Pence Expanded Indiana’s Controversial Voucher
Program when he was Governor, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/01/28/how-mike-pence-expanded-indianascontroversial-voucher-program-when-he-was-governor (discussing how Vice President
Pence expanded Indiana’s voucher program while Governor).
517. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the Indiana Choice Program and its effect on
disabled children).
518. IND. CODE § 20-51-4-3(a) (2017) (“An eligible school may not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, or national origin.”).
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words, private schools are permitted to refuse to enroll voucher
students because they have a disability.
Second, the administration of the Indiana Choice Scholarship
Program has a disparate effect on children with disabilities. It
requires these children to waive the very rights Congress crafted—via
the IDEA—to assure that children with disabilities were provided
educational opportunities their typical peers already received.519
Many state laws explicitly provide that parents who accept vouchers
must voluntarily waive their child’s right to free appropriate public
education under the IDEA.520 The D.C. Code includes a provision
that nothing in the federally funded voucher program “alter[s] or
modif[ies] the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act,”521 signifying that a federally funded voucher program
does not require private schools to comply with the IDEA.522
Moreover, the ED has explicitly issued guidance that the IDEA does
not govern private schools, even in the context of a voucher
program.523 Consequently, children with disabilities must waive their
legal right to a ‘free appropriate public education’ in order to access
the vouchers that the Trump administration claims is so imperative
for educational excellence.524
Third, students with disabilities who enter the voucher program
would have to give up not only their rights and protections under the
IDEA, but their rights and protections under both the ADA and
section 504 as well. Over ninety-five percent of schools participating
in the Indiana program are exempt from the anti-discrimination
519. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012).
520. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2114(f) (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 4016(B) (Supp. 2018);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-181-5 (Supp. 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.41(B),
3310.53(A) (LexisNexis 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-1403(a)(2) (Supp. 2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-704(5)(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017); Eckes et al., supra
note 431, at 548.
521. D.C. CODE § 38-1853.08(c) (2001).
522. Eckes et al., supra note 431, at 546.
523. Letter from Stephanie S. Lee, Director, Office of Special Education
Programs, to Individual (July 1, 2003) (quoting Letter from Office of Special
Education Programs, to Reedy, 16 IDELR 1364 (OSEP 1990) (asserting that private
schools are not “bound by the same admission and discipline policies that apply to
public schools [under the IDEA]” and that private schools participating in a Choice
program are no bound by the IDEA to “provide special education and related
services that meet the needs of all students with disabilities”) (quoting Letter from
Office of Special Education Programs, to Reedy, 16 IDELR 1364 (OSEP 1990)),
https://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2003-3/redact070103lre3q20
03.pdf.
524. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).
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provisions in the ADA and section 504.525 A survey of voucher
programs across the country reveals that none of the programs have
explicit nondiscrimination provisions that include disability as a
prohibited basis of discrimination.526
Finally, the lifelong stigma that results from inequities in
educational opportunity has long been recognized by the Supreme
Court. In Brown v. Board of Education, the court decried segregation
with the sanction of law in public schools for the detrimental effect it
has on “the educational and mental development” of the children in
the minority group.527 The severity of this concern led to years of
judicial oversight of public school desegregation. The judiciary even
oversaw desegregation in districts that had no official policies
expressly supporting segregation, but “through its actions over a
period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated
character of [city schools].”528 Additionally, the Court noted that
inequity in educational benefits stigmatizes an individual “each and
every day of his life.”529 Justice Brennan opined, “denial of education
to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the
goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the
basis of individual merit.”530
525. See supra note 410 and accompanying text (detailing exempt schools in the
Indiana program).
526. Eckes et al., supra note 431, at 547 (holding that programs that incorporate
42 U.S.C. 2000d protect students from exclusion from participation in, denial of
benefits of, and discrimination under Federally-assisted programs on ground of race,
color, or national origin, and although Mississippi requires compliance with 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which has general nondiscrimination language, courts have held that
this nondiscrimination provision does not extend to disability); see also Greggs v.
Autism Speaks, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that disability does
not fall under § 1981 as a protected class and dismissing plaintiff’s claims of
employment discrimination); Davies v. Polyscience, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 391, 392–93
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (same); Duncan v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 232, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
527. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing several contemporaneous authorities that
detail the negative lifelong effects of prejudice and discrimination on the
development of the minority group).
528. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 206 (1973). The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado oversaw forced busing in an attempt to
desegregate Denver public schools for 21 years. See James Brooke, Court Says Denver
Can End Forced Busing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/
09/17/us/court-says-denver-can-end-forced-busing.html.
529. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) (emphasizing that “[i]lliteracy is an
enduring disability”).
530. Id. at 221–22.
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Two key indicators suggest that a federally funded voucher program
would continue this trend of permitting schools to discriminate against
children with disabilities in their admission policies, thereby forcing
parents to choose between participating in the voucher program or
giving up their child’s disability education rights. First, the current
federally funded voucher program, the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship
Program, does not include disability in its nondiscrimination provision.531
Second, the nondiscrimination provision in the model voucher legislation
developed by the non-profit formally led by Secretary DeVos requires
compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which courts have consistently held
prevents racial discrimination and does not extend to disability.532
Several decades ago, Congress found systemic discrimination against
children with disabilities pervasive throughout the United States.533
The exclusion and lack of appropriate education for these children
resulted in lifelong consequences, including dependence on
government assistance as a result of the lack of meaningful educational
opportunities.534 Congress determined that the only way to resolve the
treatment of these children was to pass the IDEA to guarantee a free
appropriate public education and protect the rights of children with
disabilities and their families.535 In recent public remarks, Secretary
DeVos claimed that “[e]qual access to a quality education should be a
right for every American and every parent should have the right to
choose how their child is educated,” advocating a reduction of
federal control and choice programs as the mechanism for achieving
that path.536 However, history demonstrates that without federal
oversight and protection, children with disabilities do not receive a
quality education.537 Therefore, a federally funded voucher program

531. D.C. CODE § 38-1853.08 (2001); see also Eckes et al., supra note 431, at 546–47.
532. Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2013); Davies v.
Polyscience, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 391, 392–93 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Duncan v. AT&T
Commc’ns, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
533. See supra Section II.A (examining the Congressional research that eventually
led to the enactment of IDEA).
534. See supra note 143 and accompanying text; supra note 145 and accompanying text.
535. The IDEA 40th Anniversary, supra note 126.
536. Prepared Remarks by Betsy DeVos, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to
the American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
prepared-remarks-us-education-secretary-betsy-devos-american-enterprise-institute.
537. See, e.g., Brian M. Rosenthal, Texas Illegally Excluded Thousands from Special
Education, Federal Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/01/11/us/texas-special-education.html (identifying a situation in Texas
where thousands were kept out of special education programs due to a lack of
federal oversight).
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that requires parents to waive all of the protections created by Congress
to ensure their children access to a meaningful education imposes a
substantial and disparate burden on children with disabilities.
2. Discriminatory purpose
For a facially neutral law to be characterized as discriminatory
against students with disabilities, a disparate effect is not sufficient.
In Washington v. Davis,538 the Supreme Court held that facially neutral
government action must be “undertaken with a ‘discriminatory
purpose’” to violate the Equal Protection Clause.539 To be deemed
purposefully discriminatory, a government act must be taken because
of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.540 Any kind of evidence, including past history surrounding
the government action, legislative history, a departure from normal
procedure, or the impact itself, may be used to prove the government
act was taken because of its adverse effects.541 Challengers to a
federally funded voucher program may therefore prove intentional
discrimination against students with disabilities through public
comments, the Trump administration’s departure from normal
procedure in education governance, the history surrounding children
with disabilities’ access to educational institutions, and the impact itself.
a. Evidence of discriminatory purpose in the decision making process
Although proving discriminatory purpose is traditionally a very
high bar, challengers to voucher programs can point to the historic
exclusion of students with disabilities from equal educational
opportunities, including current state voucher programs, and the
public record of the Trump administration’s positions averse to—or
at least wholly ignorant of—disability rights. In Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,542 the Supreme Court asserted
that “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision” and the “administrative history” are examples of evidence that
is “highly relevant” to an inquiry about discriminatory purpose.543

538. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
539. Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541 (1977) (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 230).
540. Id. at 541.
541. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 253 (1977).
542. Id.
543. Id. at 267–68 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373–76 (1967);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
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Educational scholars have posited that legislatures deliberately
exclude children with disabilities because “these students might be
too expensive to educate.”544 If there is evidence that the architects
of a federal voucher program deliberately chose to impose the
disparate impacts described above to discourage—and hence
exclude—students with disabilities from participating in the program,
this would show that the government action was taken because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon students with disabilities.
In her Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary DeVos repeatedly
emphasized the decision-making authority of states and parents when
challenged to address federal civil rights law compliance.545 When
pressed about enforcement of the IDEA, Secretary DeVos suggested it
was up to states whether or not to comply with the law and seemed
unaware it was federal law.546 After several senators criticized her
responses as demonstrating lack of competence for the position,
Secretary DeVos wrote a letter to the Senate trying to assuage them of
their doubts about her knowledge of the law.547 Notably, the letter did not
suggest any mechanisms for enforcement and completely failed to discuss
the procedural rights bestowed by the law, while taking the opportunity to
push a school choice agenda for students with disabilities.548
One year into her tenure, Secretary DeVos continued issuing
statements pushing for vouchers and against taking protective action,
evincing an intent to push for vouchers without extending the
protections Congress found to be vital to meaningful education
opportunity in 1972.549 In a speech at an OSEP leadership conference
in the spring of 2017, Secretary DeVos discussed the Endrew F.

544. Eckes et al., supra note 431, at 552.
545. Joy Resmovits, Betsy DeVos Would Not Agree to Bar Discrimination by Private Schools
that Get Federal Money, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2017, 11:24 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/
education/la-essential-education-updates-southern-more-than-100-days-into-this1495643939-htmlstory.html.
546. Diament, supra note 494; Reilly, supra note 494.
547. Jordan Davidson, Betsy DeVos Writes Letter to Sen. Johnny Isakson Stating She Will
Protect IDEA, THE MIGHTY (Jan. 26, 2017), https://themighty.com/2017/01/betsydevos-idea; Letter from Betsy DeVos, Secretary of Education, to Sen. Johnny Isakson
on IDEA (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.isakson.senate.gov/public/_cache/
files/b11010c9-3b6f-47eb-b665-b3a7c9e2bcfb/01-24-17%20DeVos%20letter%20to%2
0Isakson%20re%20IDEA%20IEP.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Sen. Isakson].
548. Id.
549. See supra Section I.C (describing the push by the Trump administration for
voucher programs that require parents to give up their child’s right to an adequate
education under IDEA).
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decision.550 She asserted that parents of children with disabilities
“should be the ones to decide where and how their children are
educated” after calling the Supreme Court’s ruling “common sense.”551
Her comments illustrate her lack of understanding on these issues: were
it not for the IDEA protections, Endrew F.’s family would not have had
the ability to challenge the inferior educational plan for their child.
As troubling as Secretary DeVos’s comments may be to disability
rights proponents, they nonetheless do not rise to the level of
demonstrating discriminatory intent against students with disabilities.
Secretary DeVos’s statements and positions are indicative of
ignorance of disability law, or simply an intent to move forward with a
voucher program that does not protect children with disabilities.
This falls short of establishing an intent to exclude students with
disabilities or impose greater burdens on them because they are
students with disabilities. In fact, at least as far as Secretary DeVos’s
public statements are concerned, quite the opposite is true. As we
described above,552 Secretary DeVos has consistently claimed that
school vouchers are the best option for students with disabilities, and
advocated for voucher programs because they are, she claims,
beneficial for students with disabilities.553
While Secretary DeVos has engaged in the rhetoric of supporting
students with disabilities, President Trump explicitly made disparaging
remarks against individuals with disabilities during his 2016
presidential campaign. At a campaign event, for example, thencandidate Donald Trump openly mocked a journalist with a physical
disability.554 In the Travel Ban cases of 2017, Federal District and
Appellate Courts held that a president’s campaign statements could be
used to evince discriminatory purpose of the administration although
made prior to his inauguration.555 However, for the discriminatory
550. Betsy DeVos, Sec. of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Address at the Office of
Special Education Programs Leadership Conference (July 17, 2017), https://www.ed.
gov/news/speeches/office-special-education-programs-leadership-conference.
551. Michelle Diament, DeVos Wants More Options for Students in Special Education,
DISABILITY SCOOP (July 18, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/07/
18/devos-options-special-education/23926.
552. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
553. Id.
554. Jose A. DelReal, Trump Draws Scornful Rebuke for Mocking Reporter with Disability,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/11/25/trump-blasted-by-new-york-times-after-mocking-reporterwith-disability.
555. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 772–73 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 377 (2017). In Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018), the Supreme
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purpose requirement to be satisfied, a closer link would be required
between a discriminatory attitude towards people with disabilities in
general and a decision to create a federal voucher program free from
disability rights protections.556 There is little—at this nascent stage of
advocacy for a federal voucher program—to demonstrate any concrete
purpose to exclude students with disabilities from a federally funded
school voucher program.
b.

Departure from normal procedures as evidence of discriminatory purpose

In Arlington Heights,557 the Supreme Court held that departures
from normal procedures “might afford evidence that improper
purposes are playing a role.”558 Secretary DeVos has departed from
normal procedures in matters affecting students with disabilities on a
number of occasions. Less than nine months into her tenure as
Secretary of Education, Secretary DeVos rescinded seventy-two
guidance documents “outlining rights for disabled students” from the
Office of Special Education Programs and the Rehabilitation Services
Administration.559 A former director of the Office of Special Education
Programs noted that despite the Administration’s position that this was
part of a general effort to clean up regulations, the move does not
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of preliminary injunction. Id. at 39. The
Court came to this conclusion by applying rational basis review to President Trump’s
executive order because both immigration and national security are core executive
functions that enjoy substantial deference from the judiciary. Id. at 32–34. Chief
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion points out that “the admission and exclusion of
foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” Id. at 30
(quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). This deferential standard of review
is particularly appropriate “in admission and immigration cases that overlap with ‘the
area of national security.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Applying this deferential standard,
said Chief Justice Roberts, required the court to uphold the challenged immigration
policy “so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.” Id. at 32. The Court concluded that
“because there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we
must accept that independent justification.” Id. at 33–34. Consequently, the majority did
not address whether President Trump’s social media messages and other statements,
whether before or after his inauguration, were sufficient to establish discriminatory purpose.
556. Cf. Malone v. Greco, No. 92-CV-178S, 1995 WL 222052, at *11–12 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendants because statements were
insufficiently tied to alleged discrimination).
557. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
558. Id. at 267.
559. Balingit, supra note 496.
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purport with standard procedures for handling guidance documents.560
Moreover, during her short tenure, Secretary DeVos has changed the
mission of the Office of Civil Rights by charging investigators to
quickly close out individual cases rather than look for systemic
discriminatory practices across educational institutions.561 Additionally,
in December of 2017, Secretary DeVos proposed to delay an Obamaera rule compelling states to address racial disparities in special
education.562 The IDEA requires states to protect against overclassifying
minority students as special needs.563 Secretary DeVos acknowledged
that nearly half of school districts in America are likely violating this
provision of the IDEA.564 However, she maintained that requiring
districts to implement the rule without revision would be too costly.565
However, as with President Trump’s mocking of a person with
disabilities, the departures from normal procedures by the ED are not
directly related to the implementation of a federal school voucher
program, and therefore likely fall short of demonstrating the
discriminatory intent required for a federal voucher program to be
classified as discriminatory against students with disabilities.
c.

Suspect and quasi-suspect classes

The second reason that courts are unlikely to apply heightened
scrutiny under an equal protection challenge is that, even if
arguendo, the law is treated as discriminatory on the basis of
disability, the Supreme Court has declined to treat people with
disabilities as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
The Supreme Court has formally created two levels of heightened
scrutiny: strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. Strict scrutiny
requires the government to prove there is a “compelling state
interest” behind the action, and that the action is “narrowly tailored”

560. Casey Bayer, DeVos Rescinds Guidance Documents for Disabled Students: What Does
it Mean?, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.gse.
harvard.edu/news/17/10/devos-rescinds-guidance-documents-disabled-studentswhat-does-it-mean.
561. Nilsen & Sitrin, supra note 491.
562. Erica L. Green, DeVos Delays Rule on Racial Disparities in Special Education, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/us/politics/devosobama-special-education-racial-disparities.html.
563. See id. (explaining that rule was designed to address concerns about the
overrepresentation of minority students in special education).
564. Id.
565. See id. (“The [Department of Education] . . . estimated that it would cost
districts between $50 million and $91 million to implement the rule.”).
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to achieving that compelling state interest.566 The intermediate
scrutiny standard has evolved from requiring the government to prove
that an “important governmental objective”567 underlies the act to an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” requirement.568
Strict scrutiny applies only when the law discriminates against a
“suspect class.”569 To date, the Court has only recognized race, national
origin, and alienage as suspect classes deserving of strict scrutiny.570
The Court has only recognized two additional categories—namely
gender571 and a child’s birth status572—as quasi-suspect classes deserving
intermediate scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has not recognized that people with
disabilities are either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,573 the Court expressly held that
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification calling for

566. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 727, 730.
567. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976).
568. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding gender
classification must serve an important governmental objective to be valid).
569. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982).
570. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371–72 (1971); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 58–59 (5th Cir. 2011); LeClerc
v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415–19 (5th Cir. 2005).
571. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 555–56 (holding equal protection requires genderbased government action must demonstrate exceedingly persuasive justification for
that action); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (holding registration of
men and not women under the Military Selective Service Act to be constitutional);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 474–76 (1981) (concluding legislatures may
not make overbroad generalizations based on sex that are entirely unrelated to
differences between men and women or which demean the social status of the affected
class); Craig, 429 U.S. at 208–10 (finding classifications by gender must serve important
government objectives and must be substantially related to attainment of those objectives).
572. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent
children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its
borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state
interest.”) (emphasis added) (holding a state law that denied education to
undocumented children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding a probate law that distinguished between
legitimate and illegitimate children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (concluding classifying a child
based on non-marital status is “illogical and unjust,” and holding that law precluding
children from collecting workers’ compensation benefits because their mother was
unmarried violated the Equal Protection Clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968) (holding that classifying children based on parents’ non-marital status is an
Equal Protection violation).
573. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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heightened scrutiny,574 and no decision of the Court has recognized
disability of any kind as either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. One
could argue that the Court should treat disability as a quasi-suspect
class. Children with disabilities are in a similar position to the children
of undocumented immigrants, the most recent classification to which
the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny. Further, in Plyler v. Doe,575
the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, invalidating a Texas
statute that withheld state funds from school districts that enrolled
children who had entered the country without documentation. The
Court held that the law “imposes a lifetime of hardship on a discrete
class of children not accountable for their disabling status.”576 The
Plyler Court further expounded that “[i]f the State is to deny a
discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it
offers to other children . . . that denial must be justified by a showing
that it furthers some substantial state interest.”577 Like the immigration
status of the students in Plyler, disability is an immutable characteristic for
which children with disabilities are not responsible. Therefore, school
voucher challengers could potentially cite Plyler in support of a claim that
intermediate scrutiny applies to any deprivation of education to innocent
children based on disability.
However, even if the Court could be convinced to recognize that
children with disabilities were a quasi-suspect class, school voucher
challengers would nonetheless still fail to have heightened scrutiny apply
for the reasons set out in the previous section above.578 That is, unlike
the express exclusion of undocumented children in Plyler,579 state
voucher programs, on which a federal program is likely to be modeled,
do not expressly exclude students with disabilities. These programs do
have a disparate and adverse impact on students with disabilities, but
absent evidence of discriminatory intent, the voucher programs would
not be classified as discriminating on the basis of disability.

574. See id. at 442 (holding that persons with disabilities lack the necessary
uniformity to be jointly classified as a group deserving of intermediate scrutiny).
575. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
576. Id. at 223; see also id. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that “a class-based
denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause”).
577. Id. at 230.
578. See supra notes 573–577 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court
has not held that persons with disabilities are a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
579. 457 U.S. at 206, 229.
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B. Rational Basis with Bite
Although a court is unlikely to apply either strict or intermediate
scrutiny under a traditional analysis of fundamental rights and due
process. This does not mean, however, that a challenge to school
voucher programs by students with disabilities will necessarily fail.
Traditionally, the only alternative to either strict or intermediate
scrutiny was a radically permissive form of rational basis review.
Under this version of rational basis review, a law would be upheld
with even the most tenuous and hypothetical relationship to a
legitimate government interest.580 However, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated an increasing willingness to apply a more rigorous and
exacting standard of review even in cases where the Court purports to
be applying mere rational basis review. Many commentators have
come to describe this standard as rational basis “with bite.”581
The Court seems to apply rational basis with bite when it is
unwilling to identify a fundamental right or suspect class, but
nonetheless finds evidence of a history of discrimination or animus
against a class of persons adversely affected by the law. The two most
prominent examples are sexual orientation and—fortuitously for
present purposes—mental disability.
In Romer v. Evans,582 the Supreme Court struck down “Amendment
2” to the Colorado State Constitution, which prohibits any state or
local government actions designed to protect persons from
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.583 Despite
declining to designate sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification, the Court nonetheless held that Amendment 2 violated
the federal Equal Protection Clause.584 Referring to rational basis
review, the Court declared that “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies,
even this conventional inquiry” because “it lacks a rational relationship
to legitimate state interests.”585 The Court further explained that laws
which treat a minority group differently and lack a clear relationship to a
government interest “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of person affected.”586
580. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, of Okla., Inc. 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
581. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 507, at 732–33.
582. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
583. See id. at 626 (holding it is implausible to find Amendment 2 puts
homosexuals in a similar position as other similarly situated citizens).
584. See id. at 635–36 (striking down the Colorado provision because it does not
promote a legitimate state interest).
585. See id. at 632.
586. Id. at 634.
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Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court declared that mental retardation is
not “a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard
of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social
legislation.”587 Yet despite this declaration, the Court held that
requiring a special building permit for the operation of a home for
the mentally retarded violated equal protection. The Court explained
that:
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does
not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we
believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue
policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full
potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that
burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner.
The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary
or irrational. Furthermore, some objectives-such as “a bare . . .
desire to harm a politically unpopular group” are not legitimate
state interests. Beyond that, the mentally retarded, like others, have
and retain their substantive constitutional rights in addition to the
right to be treated equally by the law.588

Individuals with disabilities in general are, of course,
disadvantaged, ostracized, and subjected to negative stereotypes.
Their experience is often similar to that of persons with mental
retardation. Therefore, a prospective government action uniquely
affecting children with disabilities is just as likely to be prompted by
animus as the permit requirement struck down in Cleburne. As the
Court points out in both Romer and Cleburne, the government action
will be struck down—and the inference of animus is strongest—when
the relationship between the distinction and the asserted goal is so
attenuated as to be arbitrary or irrational.589 According to the ED
and other advocates of voucher programs, the primary goal of the
programs is to provide parents with more choices for how and where
to educate their children.590 However, as we explain above,591 the fact
that the rights and protections of the IDEA and other federal

587.
588.
589.
590.
591.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
Id. at 446–47.
Id. at 446; Romer, 517 U.S. at 630.
Dashboard, supra note 76.
See supra notes 319–321 and accompanying text.
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antidiscrimination legislation do not apply to private schools that
participate in voucher programs. This effectively means that parents
of students with disabilities do not have the freedom to choose to
participate in a voucher program; they are arbitrarily excluded from
goal of the voucher programs.
Furthermore, another one of the asserted goals of the ED, as we
describe above, is specifically to improve the education of students
with disabilities.592 Requiring students with disabilities to give up
their rights under the IDEA—and in most cases, the ADA and section
504 to boot—is not merely attenuated to this goal; it is wholly at odds
with it. Students with disabilities must give up their legally guaranteed
right to a free appropriate public education—and all the procedural
and substantive requirements for delivering that right—as a
precondition of participating in a voucher program. A more
irrational approach to improving the education of students with
disabilities is difficult to conceive. Provided that the ED continues to
assert the benefits to students with disabilities as a major justification
school vouchers programs, critics will have a viable claim that placing
a voucher program beyond the protection of the IDEA fails the
robust rational basis review of Cleburne and Romer.
CONCLUSION
The Trump administration, and especially the ED under the
leadership of Secretary DeVos, has clearly signaled its desire to
implement a federal school voucher program along the lines of the
program currently in effect in Indiana. In order to participate in
such a program, students with disabilities have to forego the
substantial rights and protections against discrimination that are
afforded them in public schools under the IDEA and other federal
laws. This is an unreasonable cost to place on participation in
voucher programs and makes a fallacy of the claim that so-called
“school choice” programs provide parents with greater freedom of
choice in the education of their children with disabilities. Disability
advocates should resist the adoption of voucher programs by the
federal government on the basis of their harmful and disparate
effects on students with disabilities. If this political resistance proves
futile, federal courts should strike down a federal voucher program as
discriminating against students with disabilities in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.

592. See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text; see also Section II.B.2.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: The Current Landscape of School Voucher Programs
STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

AR

Succeed Scholarship
Program for
Students with
Disabilities

(1) Have an IEP or
live in foster care;
(2) Enrolled in
Arkansas public
school the previous
year, unless a child of
active duty military or
has a school district
waiver; and
(3) Accepted for
admission into an
eligible, participating
private school594

(1) Meet accreditation
requirements;
(2) Demonstrate fiscal
soundness;
(3) Comply with
antidiscrimination
provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 2000d;
(4) Meet state and
local health and safety
requirements;
(5) Be academically
accountable to parents
for meeting students’
needs;
(6) Publish school’s
disciplinary
procedures; and
(7) Employ or contract
with at least one
teacher who has a
current, valid license
in special education
issued by the State
Board of Education595

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$6,713

593. Dashboard, supra note 76.
594. Succeed Scholarship, ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://arksped.k12.ar.us/documents/
policyAndRegulations/SucceedScholarship/SucceedScholarshipProgramExplanator
yPowerPoint.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
595. See id.
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

DC

Opportunity
Scholarship Program

(1) Household incomes
no more than 185% of
the federal poverty
guideline or receives
SNAP benefits; and
(2) Current resident of
D.C.596

(1) Have a main
campus in D.C.;
(2) Be accredited by an
accepted accrediting
agency;
(3) Have a valid
Certificate of Occupancy
listing education as a
purpose; and
(4) Be in “good”
financial standing597

1889
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$9,570

596. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “DC” on
interactive map).
597. Join the OSP, SERVING OUR CHILDREN, https://servingourchildrendc.org/forschools/join-the-osp (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (discussing eligibility requirements
for the DC SOC scholarship program).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

FL

John M. McKay
Scholarships for
Students with
Disabilities Program

(1) Have an IEP or
section 504 Plan; and
(2) Enrolled in
Florida public school
or Florida School for
the Deaf and Blind
the prior year; or
(3) Received Specialized
Instructional Services the
prior year; or
(4) Is a foster child or
has a parent that is on
active duty with the
military598

(1) Comply with
antidiscrimination
provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 2000d;
(2) Demonstrate fiscal
soundness and
accountability;
(3) Meet applicable
state and local health,
safety, and welfare laws;
(4) Provide to the
department all
documentation
required for a
student’s participation
(5) Be academically
accountable to parents
for meeting the
educational needs of
the student; and
(6) Maintain a physical
location the student
regularly attends599

598. McKay Scholarships: McKay Scholarship Program FAQs, FLA. DEP’T
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12scholarshipprograms/mckay/mckay-faqs.stml (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
599. FLA. STAT. § 1002.39(8) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 1002.421.

OF

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$7,193

EDUC.,
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

GA

Special Needs
Scholarship Program

(1) Resident of Georgia;
(2) Enrolled in
Georgia public school
the prior year; and
(3) Received special
education services at
some point during
prior school year600

(1) Be fully or
provisionally accredited
by an approved
accrediting agency;
(2) Have a physical
location in Georgia
where students physically
attend classes;
(3) Offer minimum core
subjects of math, science,
language arts, reading,
and social studies;
(4) Demonstrate the
school is financially
secure;
(5) Meet all applicable
state and local health,
safety, and welfare laws;
(6) Comply with
42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
section 504, and the ADA;
(7) Administer preand post-academic
assessments and report
to parents and Georgia
Department of
Education; and
(8) Provide clear
written quarterly
descriptions of academic
progress to parents, e.g.
report cards601

1891
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$5,606

600. Special Needs Scholarship Program, GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., www.gadoe.org/ExternalAffairs-and-Policy/Policy/Pages/Special-Needs-Scholarship-Program.aspx (last visited
Aug. 5, 2018).
601. GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., GEORGIA SPECIAL NEEDS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM PRIVATE
SCHOOL APPLICATION: 2018–2019 SCHOOL YEAR (2018).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

IN

Choice Scholarship
Program

(1) Attended public
school for two
previous semesters;
(2) Has an IEP;
(3) Lives in the
attendance zone and
would be assigned to
attend a school that
received an F on the
state school grading
system; or
(4) Previously
received a scholarship
under the scholarship
tax credit program602

(1) Located in Indiana;
(2) Requires an eligible
student to pay tuition;
(3) Voluntarily agrees
to enroll the student;
(4) Accredited by either
the state board or a
national or regional
accreditation agency;
(5) Administers
statewide assessments, at
state expense;
(6) Is not a school that
an eligible student has a
legal settlement with; and
(7) Submit required
student performance
data to the state603

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$4,342

602. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (following hyperlink; then click on “IN”).
603. See notes 402–404 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of the
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program.
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

LA

Scholarship Program

(1) Have a family
income that does not
exceed 250% of the
federal poverty line; and
(2) Be enrolled or
entering kindergarten
at a public school with a
C, D, or F letter grade604

(1) Use an open
admission process that
does not require
additional eligibility
criteria than those
specified in state statute;
(2) Notify Department
of Education of
students enrolled
within ten days of the
first day of school;
(3) Submit an
independent financial
audit conducted by an
approved certified
public accountant to
the Department of
Education;
(4) Accept scholarship
amounts as full
payment of all
educational costs,
including incidental or
supplementary fees; and
(5) Inform parents of
all rules, policies, and
procedures of the
school, including but
not limited to academic
policies, disciplinary
rules, and school
procedures605

604. Id.
605. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4022 (2013).

1893
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$5,869
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

LA

School Choice
Program for Certain
Students with
Exceptionalities

(1) Evaluated by a
Louisiana public school
district and determined
to have any one of the
following
exceptionalities: autism,
developmental delay,
mental disability, other
health impairment,
specific learning
disability, or traumatic
brain injury; AND
(2) Have an IEP, district
provided services plan
or a nonpublic school
created service plan606

Same as Louisiana
Scholarship Program607

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$2,328

606. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “LA” on
interactive map).
607. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4022.
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

MD

Broadening Options
and Opportunities
for Students Today
Program

(1) Have a family
income not exceeding
100% of the federal
free and reduced-price
lunch program608

(1) Participate in Aid
to Non-Public Schools
Program administered
by the Maryland
Department of
Education;
(2) Administer one of
the state-approved
academic assessments
annually for all
students in grades 3–8
in English/language arts
and mathematics and a
science assessment once
for students in grades 3–
5; 6–9; and 10–12; and
(3) Comply with Title
VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964609

608. Id. (follow hyperlink; then click on “MD” on interactive map).
609. S.B. 185, 2018 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2018).
610. Limited based on funds available.

1895
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$2,294610
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

ME

Town Tuitioning
Program

(1) Reside in a town
that does not have a
public school at the
student’s grade level611

(1) Meet the
requirements for basic
school approval under
state law;
(2) Is nonsectarian;
(3) Is incorporated
under state law;
(4) Comply with
reporting and auditing
requirements under
state law;
(5) Participate in
statewide assessment
program if 60% or more
of enrolled students are
publicly funded; and
(6) Release student
records to any school
unit for the student to
transfer into that unit612

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$11,162

611. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “ME” on
interactive map).
612. ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (2005).
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STATE

PROGRAM

MS

Dyslexia Therapy
Scholarship for
Students with
Dyslexia Program

THE FALLACY OF CHOICE
STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA
(1) Diagnosed with
dyslexia;
(2) In grades 1–6; and
(3) Attended a public
school or qualifying
private school
specializing in dyslexia
instruction the prior
year613

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS
(1) Accredited by the
state as a special purpose
nonpublic school;
(2) Use licensed
dyslexia therapists to
provide therapy to
students;
(3) Use daily OrtonGillingham-based
therapy;
(4) Have school
leadership trained in
dyslexia;
(5) Have a current
School Program
Verification and
Assurances form on
file with the state614

1897
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$4,980

613. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on
interactive map).
614. Dyslexia, MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.mdek12.org/OAE/OEER/
Dyslexia (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

MS

Nate Rogers
Scholarship for
Students with
Disabilities Program

(1) Diagnosed with a
speech-language
impairment;
(2) In grades 1–6; and
(3) Enrolled in a public
school or qualifying
speech therapy school
the prior year615

(1) Accredited by the
state to provide
comprehensive speechlanguage therapy
instruction and
interventions;
(2) Use qualified speechlanguage pathologist;
(3) Use a specialized
speech-language
instructional program
that is scientific and
research-based;
(4) Have a current School
Program Verification and
Assurances form on file
with the DOE
(5) Provide the DOE all
documentation required
for student’s participation;
(6) Notify the DOE when
a parent removes the
student within ten days;
(7) Be academically
accountable to parent for
meeting the educational
needs of the student,
annually, at a minimum;
(8) Maintain a physical
location in the state where
the student regularly
attends classes; and
(9) Maintain current
Letter of Accreditation
on file with the state616

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$0617

615. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “MS” on
interactive map).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

NC

Special Education
Scholarship Grants
for Children with
Disabilities

(1) Meet health and
safety regulations; and
(2) Comply with state
and federal
nondiscrimination laws.619

NC

Opportunity
Scholarships

(1) Child with a
disability who requires
special education, as
documented by an IEP;
(2) Resident of North
Carolina; and
(3) Was enrolled in
public school the
prior year; or
(4) Has a parent on
active military duty; or
(5) Received a grant
the prior year; or
(6) Is entering
kindergarten or first
grade618
(1) Have a household
income up to 133% of the
free and reduced price
lunch program; and
(2) Attended a public
school the prior
semester; or
(3) Is in foster care;
(4) Was adopted in
the past year; or
(5) Will be enrolling
in kindergarten or
first grade620

1899
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$6,401

(1) Accredited by the
state or approved
accrediting agency; and
(2) Administer state
assessment or
approved national
assessment voucher
recipients and report
results to the state; and
(3) Cannot charge
voucher students more
tuition that
non-voucher students.621

616. Guidance for Nonpublic Schools, MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://mdek12.org/OSE/
funding/special-education-speech-language-therapy-scholarship (last visited Aug. 17,
2018) (informing non-public schools about resources and requirements related to
speech-language therapy).
617. No current enrolled students.
618. Rules Governing the Special Education Grants for Children with Disabilities Program,
N.C. STATE EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTH., http://www.ncseaa.edu/pdf/rules_cdg.pdf (last
visited Aug. 17, 2018) (navigate to the document through “Program Rules” link).
619. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “NC” on
interactive map).

$3,740
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

NH

Town Tuitioning
Program

OH

Cleveland
Scholarship Program

(1) Reside in New
Hampshire; and
(2) Reside in an
identified a “tuition
town” that lacks a
district school that
offers the grade levels
students need622
(1) Lives in Cleveland
Metropolitan School
District; and
(2) Will be entering
kindergarten through
twelfth grade; and
(3) Students with a
household income
below 200% of the
federal poverty
guideline are given
preference in
receiving vouchers.623

[Vol. 67:1673

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS
None Found

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
None Found

(1) Designated as a
nonpublic school under
Ohio state law, by
completing application,
submitting an Affidavit
of Intent Not to
Discriminate and
adopting states Racial
Nondiscriminatory
policies, and developing
a Plan of Compliance to
align with Operating
Standards for Ohio’s
schools;
(2) Administer state
assessments to all
voucher students; and
(3) Accept all voucher
applicants unless
applicants exceed
school’s capacity.624

620. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “NC” on
interactive map).
621. Id.
622. New Hampshire—Town Tuitioning Program, supra note 79.
623. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on
interactive map).
624. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 14, 2018),
http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Quality-School-Choice/Private-Schools/
Forms-and-Program-Information-for-Nonpublic-School/NonpublicChecklistCharterinOhio.pdf

$4,620
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

OH

Educational Choice
Scholarship Program

OH

Educational Choice
Scholarship
Expansion Program

OH

Autism Scholarship
Program

(1) Enrolled in OR
would otherwise be
assigned to a
low-performing school
within their resident
school district625
(1) Entering grades K–3;
(2) Have a household
income up to 400% of
the poverty guideline;
and
(3) Priority is given to
students with household
income below 200% of
the poverty guideline.627
(1) Identified by their
district as a child with
autism;
(2) Has a current IEP
finalized by all parties; and
(3) Is three years of age
or older629

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS
Same as Cleveland
Scholarship
Program626

1901
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$4,705

Same as Cleveland
Scholarship
Program628

$4,084

(1) Approved by the state;
(2) Implement the
student’s IEP and
report progress to the
student’s resident
school district
(although the law
explicitly excuses the
school district from
FAPE obligation under
the IDEA); and
(3) Employ staff with
appropriate special
education credentials
for services provided.630

$22,748

625. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on
interactive map).
626. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, supra note 624.
627. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on
interactive map).
628. Nonpublic School Charter Checklist, supra note 624.
629. Autism Scholarship Program, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov
/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Autism-Scholarship-Program (last visited Aug. 17,
2018) (outlining the IEP requirements for children interested in the Autism Scholarship).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

OH

Jon Peterson Special
Needs Scholarship
Program

Same as Autism
Scholarship Program632

OK

Lindsey Nicole
Henry Scholarships
for Students with
Disabilities

(1) Have an established
IEP; and
(2) Is eligible to attend
kindergarten through
twelfth grade631
(1) Have an IEP; and
(2) Have attended
public school in
Oklahoma the prior
year633

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$9,818

(1) Accredited by the
state or other approved
accrediting association;
(2) Demonstrate fiscal
soundness;
(3) Comply with
antidiscrimination
provisions in
42 U.S.C. § 2000d;
(4) Meet state and local
health and safety laws;
(5) Academically
accountable to the
parents for meeting
the educational needs
of the student;
(6) Comply with all
state laws regulating
private schools;
(7) Adhere to
published disciplinary
procedures prior to
expelling scholarship
students634

630. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-103-04 (2017); School Choice Laws, supra note 84
(follow hyperlink; then click on “OH” on interactive map).
631. Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program, OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Special-NeedsScholarship (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
632. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-101-02; School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow
hyperlink; then click on “OH” on interactive map).
633. Lindsey Nicole Henry (LNH) Scholarship Program for Children with Disabilities,
OKLA. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 20, 2018), http://sde.ok.gov/sde/lindsey-nicole-henrylnh-scholarship-program-children-disabilities.

$6,161
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

UT

Carson Smith
Special Needs
Scholarship Program

(1) Must reside in Utah;
(2) Must have one or
more of the following
disabilities: autism,
developmental delay,
emotional disturbance,
hearing impairment,
intellectual disability,
multiple disabilities,
orthopedic impairment,
other health
impairment, specific
learning disability,
speech/language
impairment, traumatic
brain injury, visual
impairment;
(3) Must be at least
three years old and
less than nineteen,
unless has not
graduated high
school, then less than
twenty-two; and
(4) Enrolled in a
Utah public school or
received special
education services in
a private school the
prior year635

(1) Have a physical
location in Utah where
students regularly
attend classes;
(3) Obtain an audit
and report from a
licensed, independent
certified public
accountant;
(4) Comply with the
antidiscrimination
provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(5) Meet state and local
health and safety laws;
(6) Disclose to the
parents of each
prospective student,
before the student is
enrolled, the special
education services that
will be provided and the
costs of those services; and
(7) Administer an
annual assessment of
each student’s
academic progress,
report the results to
the parents, and make
the results available to
the assessment team
evaluating the student636

1903
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$5,905

634. AFFIDAVIT (Private School Compliance Statement), OKLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://sde.ok.gov/sde/sites/ok.gov.sde/files/AFFIDAVIT_0.PDF (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
635. Carson Smith Scholarship Program: General Overview, UTAH ST. BD. OF EDUC.,
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/558ca44d-ce02-4343-84a5-bc82d5c6f159 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2018).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

VT

Town Tuitioning
Program

(1) Cannot be used at
religious schools638

WI

Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program

(1) Must live in a
district that does not
operate either an
elementary or a high
school, and where
voters have approved
the use of public
funds for private
school tuition637
(1) Resident of
Milwaukee; and
(2) Family income at
or below 300% of the
federal poverty level639

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$13,152

(1) Administer the
state assessment to
voucher students in
certain grades;
(2) Allow voucher
students to opt out of
religious programs and
activities;
(3) Employ teachers
with licenses or
bachelor’s degrees;
(4) Cannot reject
applicants for any reason
other than lack of space;
(5) Cannot charge any
tuition on top of the
voucher for students in
grades K–8, or for
students in grades 9–
12 with household
incomes up to 220% of
the poverty guideline640

636. Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship: Information for Private Schools Considering Becoming
a Carson Smith Eligible School, UTAH ST. BD, OF EDUC., https://www.schools.utah.gov
/file/4202fbce-7b2c-476f-b98e-2503e5e680a4 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
637. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “VT” on
interactive map).g
638. Id.
639. Private School Choice Programs: Frequently Asked Questions for Parents—2018–19
School Year, WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/

$7,503
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

WI

Parental Private
School Choice
Program (Racine)

(1) Resident of Racine;
(2) Family income at
or below 300% of the
federal poverty level;
and
(3) Applying to grades
K4, K5, 1 or 9; or
(4) Attended a public
school in Wisconsin, or
in another state, or was
not enrolled in school,
or participated in a
School Choice
Program, or was on a
School Choice Program
waitlist the prior year641

Same as Milwaukee
Parental Choice
Program642

1905
AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$7,447

imce/sms/Choice/Student_Application_Webpage/PSCP_FAQ_2018-19_Final.pdf
(last visited Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Private School Choice Programs].
640. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on
interactive map).
641. Private School Choice Programs, supra note 639.
642. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on
interactive map).
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STATE

PROGRAM

STUDENT ELIGIBILITY
CRITERIA

PRIVATE SCHOOL
REQUIREMENTS

WI

Parental Choice
Program (Statewide)

(1) Administer the
state assessment to
voucher students in
certain grades;
(2) Allow voucher
students to opt out of
religious programs and
activities; and
(3) Employ teachers that
are licensed or have a
bachelor’s degree644

WI

Special Needs
Scholarship Program

(1) Reside in a
Wisconsin school
district other than in
the city of Milwaukee
or Racine; and
(2) Applying to grades
K4, K5, 1 or 9; or
(3) Attended a public
school in Wisconsin,
or in another state, or
was not enrolled in
school, or participated
in a School Choice
Program, or was on a
School Choice
Program waitlist the
prior year643
(1) Wisconsin resident;
(2) Enrolled in
Wisconsin public school
for the entire prior year;
(3) Have an IEP or
services plan in effect at
the time of application;
and
(4) Denied all open
enrollment applications
and all appeals of denial
upheld for prior school
year645

(1) Implement the
student’s public school
IEP and report student’s
progress to the resident
district;
(2) Employ teachers
with a license or a
bachelor’s degree; and
(3) Provide prospective
students with
information about the
special education services
the school offers646

AVERAGE
VOUCHER
VALUE593
$7,512

$12,129

643. Private School Choice Programs, supra note 639.
644. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on
interactive map).
645. Special Needs Scholarship Program (SNSP): 2017–18 Student Applications, WIS.
DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, https://dpi.wi.gov/sms/special-needs-scholarship/
student-applications-18-19 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
646. School Choice Laws, supra note 84 (follow hyperlink; then click on “WI” on
interactive map).
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Appendix B: The IDEA, section 504, and the ADA:
A Comparative Reference
THE IDEA
To provide a free,
appropriate public
education in the least
restrictive environment;
protect the rights of
children with disabilities
and their families; assist
States with efforts to
educate all children with
disabilities; and assess and
assure effectiveness of
those efforts.647
Children age 3–21 who
have a qualifying disability
under the IDEA that
requires special education
and related services.650

PURPOSE?

PROTECTS?

APPLIES TO?

All public elementary and
secondary schools,
including charters.652

647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.

SECTION 504
A civil rights law
prohibiting any program
that receives Federal
funds from discriminating
against, excluding, or
denying benefits to an
individual with a
disability.648

THE ADA
A civil rights law
prohibiting
discrimination and
guaranteeing equal
opportunity for
individuals with
disabilities.649

Any individual with a
physical or mental
impairment that
substantially limits one or
more major life
activities.651
Any program or activity
that receives federal
funding.653

The ADA uses the same
definition of individual
with a disability as section
504.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012).
Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151.
Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154.
Id. § 1401.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(6), (27) (2012).
Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151.
See Introduction to the ADA, supra note 154.

All services, programs,
and activities provided to
the public by state and
local governments,
businesses and non-profit
service providers.654
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PROVIDES FOR A
FREE, APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC
EDUCATION?

PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS?

DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
PROCESS?

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE IDEA
Yes. The IDEA was passed
to assure children with
disabilities have a “free
appropriate public
education . . . designed to
meet their unique
needs.”655
The IDEA includes a
rigorous set of explicit
procedural safeguards,
including, but not limited
to, written prior notice in
parents native language, a
right to review records,
and a right to an
independent educational
evaluation.658
The IDEA details specific
requirements for
complaints, mediations,
impartial hearings, and
appeals to resolve
disagreements between
schools and parents.660
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SECTION 504
Yes. Section 504 uses this
term to describe an
education comparable to
their peers without
disabilities.656 The right is
about leveling the playing
field not providing
educational benefit.657
Section 504 includes
limited procedural
safeguards, including,
notice, parent right to
review records, a review
procedure, and an
impartial hearing under
limited circumstances.659

THE ADA
None.

Section 504 provides for
impartial hearings to
resolve disputes but leaves
the administrative details
to the discretion of the
school.661

None.

None.

655. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(2012).
656. DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, supra note 304 (discussing the primary
differences in the rights of students and parents under IDEA and section 504).
657. Wright & Wright, supra note 321.
658. Id.
659. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2017).
660. See supra Section II.B.3.
661. See Wright & Wright, supra note 321.
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PROTECTIONS?

ENFORCEMENT?
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THE IDEA
Under the IDEA, if a
school removes a child for
more than ten days in one
school year, the IEP team
must meet to determine
the most appropriate
educational placement
and supports for the
child. The IDEA protects
a child’s right to FAPE
despite disciplinary
action.662
The IDEA is enforced on
an individual level
through dispute
resolution procedures
and on a systemic level by
the Office of Special
Education Programs, part
of the U.S. Department of
Education.664

1909

SECTION 504
There is no explicit
protection in the statute.
However, the Office of
Civil Rights has issued
guidance that schools may
not discriminate against
students with disabilities
in disciplinary actions
without additional
safeguards.663

THE ADA
None.

Section 504 is enforced by
The Office for Civil Rights
for the U.S. Department
of Education.665

The DOJ enforces the
ADA through settlements
and lawsuits.666

662. See supra Section II.B.3; see also supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
663. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON HOW TO ADMINISTER
STUDENT DISCIPLINE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATING 1, 20 (Jan. 8, 2014),
https://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (stating that the ED will examine
school disciplinary policies to ensure that they are clear and nondiscriminatory).
664. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012); see also supra Section II.B.3; supra notes 239–41
and accompanying text.
665. Protecting Students with Disabilities, supra note 151.
666. ADA Responsibilities: ADA Enforcement, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.ada.gov/
enforce_footer.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).

